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On January 19, 1981, the United States signed. an agreement with Iran
that achieved the release of fifty-two American hostages held captive in
Iran for over a year.' In exchange for the safe return of the hostages, the
United States returned Iranian property that had been seized in this
country pursuant to a presidential order.2 The agreement, ending what
one court termed a "sorry chapter [in] the history of our country,"'3 re-
quired a controversial intrusion by the executive into federal court litiga-
tion.4 The Supreme Court sought to lay the controversy to rest in Dames
& Moore v. Regan. 5
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
tt J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 20
I.L.M. 223 (1981). The agreement consisted of two separate declarations. The first provided
for the transfer of Iranian assets held in this country to the Bank of England. The second
provided for the creation of an arbitral tribunal which would adjudicate any commercial
claims between American nationals and Iran, unless the underlying agreements themselves
required dispute resolution exclusively in an Iranian forum.
2. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West
Supp. 1985). The Supreme Court assumed that the assets were frozen so that they could later
be used as a "bargaining chip." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1981). The
freeze may also be attributed to a fear of financial instability, resulting from the abrupt with-
drawal of up to $8 billion from American banks.
3. Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 657
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally G. SICK, ALL FALL DOWN (1985); J. STEWART, THE
PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS 19-52 (1982); Cutler, Negotiat-
ing the Iranian Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 996 (1981) (describing the negotiations leading to a
final accord).
4. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
General Principle E, 20 I.L.M. at 224, expressed the purpose of both nations "to terminate all
litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and bring
about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration."
In order to effectuate the claims settlement provision of the agreement, which provided for
the establishment of a new forum for binding arbitration, General Principle B specifically obli-
gated the United States "to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving
claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify
all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such
claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration." Id.
This necessarily required that the executive branch take steps to remove all pending litigation
from federal courts in which they had properly been brought.
5. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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The Court in Dames & Moore confronted two principal issues:
(1) whether the seized Iranian assets lawfully could be removed from this
country, and (2) whether private commercial claims against Iran could
lawfully be transferred to a new arbitral tribunal. To resolve the first
question, the Court relied on a broad reading of the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in order to uphold the President's
nullification of judicial attachments.6 The Court held that, under that
statute, the President's wide-ranging authority to control foreign assets
during a national emergency included the power to release Iranian assets
seized by private American claimants. 7
The second issue before the Court-the extent of the executive's power
to dispose of private commercial claims-raised more fundamental con-
stitutional questions concerning the scope of presidential authority in for-
eign affairs. The Court culled support for the constitutionality of
presidential action from historical executive conduct.8 Instead of resting
on the independent authority of the President under Article II of the
Constitution, the Court ultimately relied on Congress's implicit "ac-
quiesence" in the executive's well-established practice of settling claims.9
6. 453 U.S. at 672-73. The operative section of IEEPA is set out at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)
(1982):
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may,
under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instruction, licenses, or other-
wise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country
or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ac-
quisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to,
or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof
has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
7. 453 U.S. at 672-74.
8. 453 U.S. at 679-80. The Court cited with approval Justice Frankfurter's words in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (concurring opinion),
that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Con-
gress and never before questioned. . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in
the President by § 1 of Art. II." 453 U.S. at 686.
This language was dictum, since Justice Frankfurter joined the majority in finding no sup-
port for President Truman's seizure of steel mills. Yet his concurring opinion remains impor-
tant for its analysis of the varied sources and evolving nature of executive power. This
approach is distinct from that taken in Justice Black's opinion for the Court, which confined
the sources of presidential power to narrowly construed congressional delegations and express
constitutional grants of authority. Id. at 585-89.
9. 453 U.S. at 668-77. The Court considered three separate statutes that touched on the
settlement issue. First, the Court found that JEEPA did not confer authority on the executive
to suspend private litigation since lawsuits were not interests in property contemplated by the
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This acquiescence was purportedly demonstrated by "the general tenor
of Congress's legislation."10 The Court, declining to declare a "plenary"
executive power to settle claims, and able to discern only "acqui-
esce[nce]" from congressional actions,11 felt constrained "to rest [its] de-
cision on the narrowest possible ground,"1 2 rather than "to lay down
general 'guidelines'" which could govern other similar situations.13
By authorizing the release of Iranian property and suspending private
lawsuits against Iran,' 4 the Court reached the most pressing objective-
permitting the government to fulfill international obligations.' 5 However,
drafters of IEEPA, or its model, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Id. at 675. See
Note, The United States-Iran Hostage Agreement: A Study in Presidential Powers, 15 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 149, 173-74 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Hostage Agreement]. But see Chas. T.
Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 815-18 (1st Cir. 1981)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that lawsuits against Iran, as exercises of a "right...
with respect to. . .property," may be suspended and settled pursuant to IEEPA). Nonethe-
less, the Court concluded that IEEPA impliedly endorsed wide executive discretion in times of
national emergency. 453 U.S. at 681-82.
Second, the Court analyzed the so-called "Hostage Act," 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982), and held
that although the Act did not explicitly confer authority on the President to suspend the litiga-
tion, it did lend support to broad presidential discretion when American lives were in danger.
453 U.S. at 676-78. Cf American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430,
452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring); Mikva & Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the
"Hostage Act," 49 U. CHL L. REv. 292, 334-36, 344 (1982).
Finally, the Court considered the International Claims Settelement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1621-1645 (1982), creating a Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC). The FCSC, a
division of the Justice Department, is authorized to adjudicate claims for which a fund has
been established by international agreement, and to "preadjudicate" claims in anticipation of
lumpsum settlements with countries. For example, such preadjudicated claims with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China were settled in 1979 by a lump sum payment and distributed to claim-
ants on a pro rata basis. The Court found that the procedures set out for national valuation of
international claims implied congressional authorization of executive actions taken to settle
such claims. 453 U.S. at 680-82. See also Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Con-
stitutional Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 177-78 (1985)
(citing corroborative legislative history of the Settlement Act) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exec-
utive Claims Settlement Power].
10. 453 U.S. at 678.
11. Id. at 688. Two circuit courts of appeals had reached similar results, holding that the
President's power to settle claims was not "plenary," Chas T. Main Int'l, 651 F.2d at 814, and
that upholding executive authority in this instance should not be viewed as a preclusion of
future congressional involvement. American Int'l Group, 657 F.2d at 437-39, 445.
12. 453 U.S. at 660-61.
13. Id. at 661.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West
Supp. 1985). President Reagan's Order merely "suspended" litigation and provided for its
revival in U.S. courts if the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal later declined to take jurisdic-
tion over a claim. A decision on the merits by the Tribunal would terminate the litigation that
had been suspended.
The President's Order introduced elements of suspension and revival of claims nowhere
provided in the agreements, which had called simply for their "termination." The benefit to
claimants from the Order's apparent modification is questionable. After failing on jurisdic-
tional grounds in the Tribunal, private claimants could go back to district court, but without
any attached property with which to satisfy their claims.
15. 453 U.S. at 688. Some commentators have suggested that the decision was compelled
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it did not provide a satisfactory legal theory for the executive's suspen-
sion of ongoing lawsuits and transfer of claims to the newly created
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 16
Commentators have criticized the Court's theory of "implied congres-
sional delegation" of power to the executive, 17 which seemed to justify
unfounded executive interference in the litigation of private disputes.' 8
The two principal criticisms of the decision have been that the Court
upheld an executive action that effectively removed the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, in violation of Congress's authority over jurisdiction es-
tablished in the Constitution, 19 and that the Court granted Iran immu-
nity in U.S. courts, in violation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).20 Ironically, the same critics have endorsed the Court's holding,
either by embracing justifications with other serious defects2' or by
more by the pressure of events than by cogency of reasoning. See, e.g., Miller, Dames & Moore
v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1104 (1982).
16. Two thoughtful commentators have accurately formulated the issue in Dames & Moore
to be "whether the President could force a plaintiff with a cognizable claim pending against a
sovereign government to accept an alternative forum." Marks & Grabow, The President's
Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 68, 88 (1982). They concluded that the "Court nowhere explains why
'suspension' of the statutorily-conferred right to proceed in the United States district courts
• . . is not jurisdictional (and therefore invalid)." Id. at 96-97. This failing in the Court's
decision derives from its tentativeness in "legitimizing independent executive powers in foreign
affairs." The Supreme Court: 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 198 (1981); See also Note,
Executive Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 162-63.
17. See, e.g., Marks & Grabow, supra note 16, at 68, 91-92; The Supreme Court: 1980
Term, supra note 16, at 191, 194; Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan: Congressional Power over
Foreign Affairs Held Hostage by Executive Agreement with Iran, 15 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 248,
274, 280 (1982); Comment, Iranian Assets and Claims Settlements Agreements: A Study of
Presidential Foreign Relations Power, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1364, 1405 (1982).
18. Comment, The Iranian Hostage Agreement Cases: The Evolving Presidential Claims
Settlement Power, 35 Sw. L.J. 1055, 1077 (1982).
19. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 establishes Congress's authority "[t]o constitute Tribunals in-
ferior to the Supreme Court." Article III, § I provides that "The judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1982) (an act which, inter alia, removed the executive
from determinations of sovereign immunity from suit in United States courts, thus leaving that
determination a strictly judicial issue). See Marks & Grabow, supra note 16, at 94-97; Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 1400; Note, Hostage Agreement, supra note 9, at 189. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-22.
21. It has been suggested that the Court should have invoked the political question doc-
trine to dispose of the thorny institutional issues posed in Dames & Moore, see The Supreme
Court: 1980 Term, supra note 16, at 198-201, yet this approach is undesirable when the rights
of private claimants and federal court jurisdiction are conceivably implicated. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-79 (1978).
Another proposal was to affirm the President's power to settle claims and suspend litigation,
but only "under circumstances like those of the Iranian crisis." Note, The Iranian Hostage
Agreement under International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 822, 868-70
(1981). This "extraordinary situation" rule suggests a limitation on executive power from the
standpoint of public policy, but posits no clear legal theory justifying the exercise of executive
power to guide courts in deciding when the executive has acted properly.
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approving the decision without providing an alternate legal reasoning.22
As a result, the scope of the executive's power to settle claims of Ameri-
cans against foreign states remains in doubt.23
Reliance by numerous courts and commentators on a rigid analytical
framework, developed in earlier judicial opinions, has clouded reasoning
about the hostage agreements. For the most part, courts have heeded
Justice Jackson's admonition in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer 24 not to resort to nebulous catchwords when characterizing executive
actions. Nonetheless, they have also relied on Justice Jackson's categori-
zation of executive action.25 Courts have upheld the President's termina-
tion of Iranian litigation as the use of executive authority in the "zone of
twilight"-Justice Jackson's intermediate category-in which the Presi-
dent acts alone, without a clear directive from Congress.26 Alternatively,
courts have relegated executive actions to category three-actions in con-
flict with the express or implied will of Congress-by interpreting claims
settlement as a direct violation of the FSIA and of Congress's authority
over federal court jurisdiction.27 These analyses, reaching disparate re-
22. See, eg., Marks & Grabow, supra note 16, at 69; Note, supra note 17, at 283-84; Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 1407.
23. In the vast literature on Dames & Moore, only two works have inquired into the legal
foundations of executive claims settlement, or "espousal" power. Further, in one treatment the
consideration is brief; Note, Settlement of the Iranian Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of Constitu-
tional and Statutory Executive Prerogative in Foreign Affairs, 13 N.Y.U. J. INV'L L. & POL.
993, 1042-47 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Settlement of the Hostage Crisis], and in the
other, the historical treatment concentrates narrowly on the twentieth century. Note, Execu-
tive Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 157-59. More importantly, neither work places
the Iranian agreement in the context of the evolving international law of claims settlement nor
recognizes the critical interplay between claims settlement and sovereign immunity. See id. at
177, 186 (maintaining that executive power to settle claims has basically supplanted the power
over foreign sovereign immunity decisions).
24. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Also, courts have generally
eschewed the declaration of expansive presidential powers in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) in assessing the hostage agreements. Compare Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 with Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't and State of Iran, 513 F. Supp.
864, 871-75, 881-82 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
25. E.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661-62.
Justice Jackson sketched three zones of executive conduct. In the first, the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied grant of authority from Congress; under these conditions,
executive authority is at its strongest. In the second zone, the President acts without either
support or disapproval from Congress; in this case, the result is highly uncertain. In the last
zone, the President acts against the express or implied will of Congress; there, executive power
is at its lowest ebb. 343 U.S. at 635-38.
Our concern with undue reliance on Justice Jackson's formula is not meant to suggest that it
is unsuitable for the Iranian situation; on the contrary, it is helpful in sorting out the institu-
tional conflicts. However, Jackson's flexible framework has grown rigid through repeated ap-
plication, and sketchy categories have become reified. The framework's invocation, at least in
the Iranian context, has resulted in excessive concern with categorization, and inadequate at-
tention to the historical and legal roots of executive action.
26. E.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
27. E.g., Marschalk Co., 518 F. Supp. at 86; Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social
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suits, reveal the limits of categorization. For instance, concluding that a
presidential action falls into category two of Justice Jackson's scheme
gives no clear guidance in determining how the action fits within existing
legal rules. Therefore, this Article will forego a strict constitutional anal-
ysis, putting in its place a legal archeology that uncovers specific doc-
trines underlying past and present executive decisions. The Article offers
a theory to explain the evolution and exercise of important executive
powers.
This Article departs from previous analyses in three significant re-
spects. The first part of the Article places the President's well-estab-
lished, independent power to settle claims in the context of international
legal doctrines as assimilated by executive practice and judicial opinions
into domestic law.28 The second part identifies a nonstatutory executive
authority to grant immunity to foreign state property at the stage of exe-
cution. By providing a coherent account of preexisting, independent au-
thority, this Article counters the expansive reading of the FSIA which
has construed the statute to remove the executive entirely from litigation
against foreign states.29 The third part demonstrates that the claims set-
tlement and sovereign immunity doctrines are complementary and have
supported executive actions in the past that have helped to overcome
diplomatic impasses.30 It concludes that due to the continuing need for
political involvement, a tension between private remedies and public con-
trol persists.
This analysis of the interplay between the President's powers to settle
claims and to grant sovereign immunity focuses on the need for con-
Sec. Org. of Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1364-65 (N.D. Tex 1981), vacated in part, affid
in part, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as EDS]; Marks & Grabow, supra note
16, at 95-97.
28. Other commentators have recognized an independent executive authority to settle
claims, yet have founded it on a reading of terse Constitutional passages, such as that authoriz-
ing the executive to receive ambassadors, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See, e.g., Note, Executive
Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 164-75. The value of a historical approach, such as
the one presented here, was recognized, but it was not reflected in a full-scale treatment. Id. at
171 n.83, 172.
29. The issue of independent executive authority to grant immunity from execution was
not addressed in Dames & Moore, since pre-judgment attachments against Iran had been
granted pursuant to the President's freeze order (entered under IEEPA authority), see New
England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F.
Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and in the Court's view could be removed under authority de-
rived from the same statute. See supra notes 2 and 7 and accompanying text. However, the
need for independent authority was presented directly in EDS, 508 F. Supp. at 1356, 1361, in
which the district court refused to nullify an attachment that had been granted prior to the
freeze order. See infra text accompanying notes 281-291.
30. See R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SIX PROCEDURAL
STUDIES 199-200 (1965) (making a prescient, if critical, suggestion as to how the claims settle-
ment and sovereign immunity powers might converge, giving the executive authority to
stymie domestic litigation when the needs of foreign policy are pressing).
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tinuity in the conduct of foreign affairs. 31 It does not view the Iranian
agreement as an unusual exercise of executive authority, unique in the
nation's history.32 Rather, the Article defends the role played by these
executive powers in the past and contends that they should not be gain-
said in the future, when the nation may once again be forced to overcome
imposing diplomatic obstacles.
I. The Law of Claims Settlement
The absence of an appreciation of the rich law of international claims
settlement has detracted from scholarly and judicial analyses of the Ira-
nian agreements. Although that body of law has undergone conceptual
changes in recent years, it still retains a vocabulary and direction that
arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period of formal-
ism in the study of international law. As a result, a somewhat rigid style
tends to obscure otherwise sound legal rules. It is important at the outset,
therefore, to state the assumptions that underlie those rules and the pol-
icy perspective that reinforces the legal analysis presented below.33
As Professor Frederick Dunn observed in his classic account, claims
settlement-or, more generally, diplomatic protection of citizens-
should be seen as a practice that is closely linked to the shifting economic
and political interests of states. 34 The legal rules of claims settlement
have grown out of the efforts of states to resolve commercial disputes
without endangering the entire international system of productive ex-
change.35 While the promotion of purely individual interests is a valuable
goal,36 and private individuals are the ostensible beneficiaries of claims
31. See The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (statement of Senator Percy) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Hearings].
32. As one classic work has pointed out, the assertion of private economic claims occupies
a considerable part of diplomatic officials' time and is often intertwined with major policy
questions. F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 12-13 (1932). See also Wetter, Diplo-
matic Assistance to Foreign Investment, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 275 (1962) (reviewing extensive
government claims settlement practice between 1900 and 1940).
33. Professor Dunn, in criticizing the legal formalism of his day, stressed the importance
of seeking explanations and justifications for legal rules in social characteristics, not in the
rules themselves. See DUNN, supra note 32, at 3, 197. In his functionalist legal realism, diplo-
matic protection was viewed as "a human institution devised for a particular social purpose."
Id. at 9.
34. Id. at 26, 35 (diplomatic protection promotes the material interests of states through
safe economic investment, without the dangers of forceful invasion or annexation in resolving
international disputes).
35. Id. at 190-91 ("the underlying purpose of the institution of diplomatic protection
seems to be to aid in the maintenance of the conditions of order and security that are essential
for the carrying on of normal social and economic relations across national boundaries").
36. Several of the most articulate statements affirming individual rights and duties in inter-
national law appeared during and shortly after World War II. Against the background of total
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settlement among states, their immediate interests are not exclusive or
always paramount. 37 When those interests clash with the nation's, and
international discord is threatened, the interest of the national commu-
nity should prevail. Existing legal doctrines of claims settlement, ad-
dressed below, uphold the controlling authority of states.
A. The International Law of Diplomatic Protection
International law has traditionally governed only the relations among
states.38 Although private individuals and corporations engage in com-
merce directly with foreign governments, and inevitably incur compensa-
ble injuries, private persons have usually lacked substantive rights and
procedural protection under international law.39 Naturally, private indi-
viduals and entities have sought assistance from their governments in
pressing claims against nations that breach their commitments. This is
the legal setting for the practice of "diplomatic protection," by which a
state proffers-or "espouses"-the claims of its nationals against foreign
states.4° At a time when individuals lacked any direct right of redress in
the international sphere, espousal was in the individual's as well as the
war and tyrannical governments, a conception of the individual's status apart from member-
ship in a state understandably took on great significance. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (1968); P. JEssUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 1-
2, 13-14 (1948); Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 16-
17 (1941); Wright, International Law and Commercial Relations, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
39 (1941). Recognition of individual dignity remains vital today, but the matter is not
presented so sharply. As the movement of goods and individuals across state boundaries
grows, it is conceivable that private interests could stand in the way of a genuine national
interest in the resolution of conflicts. In such a case, the interest of the international commu-
nity-another element in a "modern law of nations"-might counsel a result contrary to im-
mediate individual interests. P. JEssup, supra, at 11-12. In short, even in an international legal
order that accords individuals a large measure of substantive and procedural rights, state pre-
rogative could not disappear.
37. Professor Dunn, for example, had "no proposal. . . that individuals should be permit-
ted to resort to suits against states indiscriminately. From a procedural standpoint, I think it
would be very unfortunate if that were so." Dunn, supra note 36, at 22. See also F. DUNN,
supra note 32, at 190-91 (stating the possibly salutary effect of reducing private independence
in the name of diplomatic protection).
38. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations (pt. 2), 64 LAW Q. REV, 97, 107
(1948); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the
Individual in External Arenas, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 555, 559 (M. McDougal &
W. Reisman eds. 1981). But see Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations, 45 MICH. L.
REv. 383, 384-86 (1947) (international law applies to individuals).
39. It has been said that "the rules of international law are binding upon and create rights
and liabilities between states only. . . . Individuals. . . are the beneficiaries of the rights and
duties which international law ascribes to states." E. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
OF CITIZENS ABROAD 18 (1919). See also Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations (pt.
1), 63 LAW Q. REv. 438, 440-1 (1947); Note, The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to
Espouse the International Claims of United States Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95
(1973).
40. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 349-50; Jessup, Responsibility of States for




state's interest, for it was the only means of promoting the national's
personal and commercial security.41
Espousal by a private claimant's government has had important legal
consequences for both the status of a claim and control over its disposi-
tion. Upon espousal, what begins as a private claim is transformed, or
"merged," into a public claim between the espousing government and the
offending government. 42 The practical effect of espousal is to take a claim
completely out of the private claimant's control. The state, with binding
effect on a claimant, may waive the claim entirely or settle it for an
amount substantially less than its fair value, regardless of the claimant's
wishes. 43 This legal regime, though built at a time when state involve-
ment in international trade was more limited than it is today, remains
basically intact;44 growth in the volume and scope of state trading has
not toppled it.45 Some modern authorities, though hesitant to rely on the
fiction of "merger" of claims, have found continued validity in the tradi-
tional espousal doctrine. 46
41. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 12 (judgment
of Aug. 30, 1924) (holding that "[it is an elementary principle of international law that a State
is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed
by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordi-
nary channels").
42. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 275-84 (1937); E. BORCHARD,
supra note 39, at 356-57. See also Koessler, Government Espousal of Private Claims Before
International Tribunals, 13 U. CHI. L. REv. 180, 182-84 (1945); Hostie, Systematic Inquiry
into the Principle of International Law Dealing with Diplomatic Protection, 19 TUL. L. REv. 79,
80-82 (1945).
The World Court endorsed this traditional principle emphatically: "By taking up the case
of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action . . . on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law." Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 41; see also
Panavezys Saldutiskis Railway Case, 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 76 (judgment of Feb. 28,
1939); Case Concerning the Factory at Cherzow, 1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17 (judgment of
Sept. 13, 1928).
43. E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 358, 366-71. See also 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note
42, at 275; Hostie, supra note 42, at 80 n.7 ("[T]here is no doubt about the correctness of [the]
statement that there is nothing in international law to prevent a state from acting on behalf of a
national against the expressed will of the latter.").
44. Professor Lillich has remarked that "[w]hile the traditional rules in this area.., have
undergone considerable modification, this change has occurred within the system rather than
through rejection of it." INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 11 (R. Lillich ed. 1983) (collection of essays recognizing the continuing validity of
traditional espousal theory). In addition, Mavrommatis, decided by the World Court in 1924,
remains valid international precedent, id., and diplomatic protection still enjoys "widespread
invocation by nearly all States." Id. at 12.
45. See Friedmann, The Growth of State Control Over the Individual, and its Effect Upon
the Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 118 (1938).
46. Recent discussions of the theory and practice of claims settlement have acknowledged
continuing adherence to the idea of claim transformation. See 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE
CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 80-81 (1984); 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP-SuM AGREEMENT 1 (1975); W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 631-32 (2d ed. 1962); Seyersted, Has
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Several writers, however, have argued that elements of the law of es-
pousal are anachronistic. 47 Traditional espousal doctrine, they argue,
does not reflect the status of individuals and entities as "objects" of inter-
national law, with both rights and duties conferred directly upon them.48
Specifically, commentators have pointed out that there is no natural coin-
cidence between private and public injuries, suggesting that governments
do not so much espouse their own public claims as present private claims
of their nationals. In this view, espousal does not mysteriously transform
a claim and remove the private substantive interest entirely. Rather, it is
simply a procedural mechanism for presenting a claim against a foreign
state not available to individuals under international law.49 Arbitral
tribunals, in fact, have acknowledged the essentially private quality of the
claims presented to them by governments.50 Nevertheless, even under
this modified theory, states take control of a claim upon formal settle-
ment.5 1 While diplomatic presentation does not completely transform a
the Government a Duty to Accord Diplomatic Assistance and Protection to its Nationals?, 12
SCAN. STUD. IN L. 121, 123-24 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 211, comment a (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
47. See Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 441, 458; Jessup, supra note 40, at 923; McDougal,
Lasswell & Chen, supra note 38, at 560.
These distinguished writers regard the legal transformation of private commercial claims
into interstate claims as a harmful fiction, consigning injured persons to the sidelines as their
claims are presented diplomatically. Basically, they have urged, as an alternative, that states
and individuals be placed on equal footing in international forums, thereby obviating the need
for formal state control over private claims. Eg., Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 458-59; Jes-
sup, supra note 40, at 923. In effect, they would use procedural reforms as a means of enhanc-
ing substantive rights.
Yet the formalism of a private claim's transformation into a public claim is not inconsistent
with the overarching fiction that gives the state-an inanimate, artificial construct-a person-
ality with rights and duties in international law. See E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS,
1919-1939, at 148-49 (1964). Just as states, not "peoples," negotiate treaties or make wars,
even though individuals feel the benefits of peace and bear the burdens of war, it is arguable
that private injuries become genuinely different when they are taken up as matters of state.
Fictions 1fil the legal world; the question is whether a particular fiction serves a worthwhile
purpose, as the fiction of transformation arguably does here.
48. Professor Lauterpacht has noted that state action directly against pirates, violators of a
blockade, and war criminals refutes "the view that States only, and not individuals, are sub-
jects of international duties." Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 442. Lauterpacht has also drawn
attention to multinational agreements which entitle individuals to vindicate rights directly in
international tribunals. Id. at 451-52. See also McDougal, Lasswell & Chem, supra note 38, at
634.
49. See, eg., W. BISHOP, supra note 46, at 737-38, 741;'Koessler, supra note 42, at 181,
188-89.
50. For example, a claims commission held that it dealt "with private claims of citizens
which have been espoused by their respective Governments." Parker v. United Mexican
States, General Claims Commission, United States and Mexico, Opinions of Commissioners 36
(1927) [hereinafter cited as General Claims Commission]. See also Admin. Dec. no. V, Mixed
Claims Commission, United States and Germany, Administrative Decisions and Opinions 175,
192 ("The ultimate object of asserting the claim is to provide reparation for the private claim-
ant.") [hereinafter cited as Mixed Claims Commission].
51. See, eg., 2 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 46, at 500 ("Whether. . .as a matter of
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claim, such state protection does alter the character of the claim by sub-
jecting it to the political imperatives that govern any other subject of
diplomatic negotiation.52
Although a claim settlement might occur suddenly, working an abrupt
change in an individual's legal rights and duties, the process of negotiat-
ing a bargain diplomatically is often protracted. Once an alleged injury
occurs, the private claimant may negotiate directly with a foreign state.
At this stage the claimant's government might lend its "good offices"-
for example, by helping to procure local counsel-or take a further step
and make initial diplomatic contacts on the claimant's behalf.53 Power to
abandon or settle the claim during this period remains with the private
claimant, 54 and private efforts sometimes lead to a favorable result.55 If
political relations between this country and an offending government
worsen, however, private initiatives are probably futile, and formal diplo-
matic protection is the only realistic avenue of recovery.56 Under these
circumstances, formal presentation by the state is favorable to the claim-
ant even though he loses control of the claim.
Diplomatic protection, therefore, is only one phase in the adjudication
of private commercial claims against foreign states. The claim's national-
ity derives from the injured claimant, who may retain control over the
claim's disposition at early stages of its presentation.57 At the same time,
formal presentation by the state is a critical step. While a private claim is
principle, the international claim is under the complete control of the espousing State, must
not raise any doubt."); General Claims Commission, supra note 50, at 36; Mixed Claims Com-
mission, supra note 50, at 190 (when a claim is espoused, "the nation's absolute right to control
it is necessarily exclusive. In exercising such control it. . .must exercise an untrammelled
discretion in determining when and how the claim will be presented and pressed. . . and the
private owner will be bound by the action taken").
52. Although the traditional "merger" theory and the more current "control" theory have
the same impact with respect to a binding diplomatic settlement, the newer doctrine may give
private claimants greater freedom to contract for Calvo Clauses, by which the claimants disa-
vow state protection under certain circumstances, 2 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 46, at
500, and greater freedom to bar state protection by prior settlement. See also infra note 57.
53. See Wetter, supra note 32, at 305-06, 309-10; Christenson, International Claims Proce-
dure Before the Department of State, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 527, 539-41 (1962).
54. Throughout the Iranian crisis, for example, intense diplomatic efforts and private liti-
gation proceeded simultaneously.
55. See 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 46, at 10.
56. An attorney in the U.S. State Department has confirmed this view of claims settlement,
identifying roughly three stages in the process: (1) private initiatives, (2) informal diplomatic
correspondence, and (3) official claims espousal. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The
State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 661 (1962).
57. Private settlement of a claim will normally act as a bar to a later attempt by the claim-
ant's government to espouse the claim. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 713 comment b (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982). See also L. Sohn & R. Baxter, Convention on the International Responsi-
bility of States for Injuries to Aliens (Draft No. 12 with Explanatory Notes), partially reprinted
in Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 548 (1961) (Article 24 expressly bars a state from presenting a claim after
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not transformed into a strictly public state claim, the claim does take on
an additional public character upon state presentation. In sum, once a
state formally takes up a private claim, international law subordinates
the individual's right to control the claim to the diplomatic interests of
his government.59
B. Justifications of State Control
The policy considerations behind the present law of claims settlement
are compelling. For example, diplomatic involvement in settling claims
after a new regime's expropriation of property or cancellation of its
predecessor's contractual obligations is necessary to mitigate tensions. In
fact, when international tensions are high, private claimants have the
least hope for a private recovery and eagerly seek their government's
assistanceA° Professor Jessup, though an advocate of enhanced individ-
ual rights, included within the ambit of private international relations
only the "ordinary claims case," apparently recognizing the need for
political entry into other situations.61 The practical alternative to diplo-
matic protection, on many occasions, is not private control, but rather
political or military actions62 that would embroil the inhabitants of both
countries. When a dispute due to the hostile act of another state has
wide political ramifications, it is reasonable for an individual claim "[to]
be balanced [against] the interests of the other nationals of the State
concerned." '63
private settlement, on the theory that the state, upon espousal, assumes a claim no greater than
that possessed by the claimant).
58. See Lauterpacht, supra note 38, at 7 ("in relation to the current view that the rights of
the alien within foreign territory are the rights of his State and not his own, the correct way of
putting the matter is not that the State asserts its own right but that it enforces the rights of the
individual who is incapable of asserting it in the international sphere").
59. This view was embraced by Professors Louis Sohn and Richard Baxter, who acknowl-
edged the private character of a claim, yet accorded the state "complete control" over it, and
"unfettered discretion" to "waive, compromise, or settle any claim with binding effect." Sohn
& Baxter, supra note 57, at 580 (Art. 25 and Explanatory Note).
60. See Note, Executive Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 156 n.2 ("Citizens who
would otherwise have no effective means of redress generally appreciate government interven-
tion, especially where the courts of a foreign nation may be expected to be unreceptive to
American claims.").
61. Jessup, supra note 40, at 923.
62. See 6 J.Q. ADAMS, MEMOIRS 383, reprinted in 6 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
DIGEST 1026 (1906).
63. Sohn & Baxter, supra note 57, at 580 (Art. 25 and Explanatory Note) ("the claim of
the individual must on many occasions yield to the overriding demands of the Community of
which he forms a part").
Umpire Parker observed that the state's control over private claims should be governed "not
only by the interest of the particular claimant but by the larger interests of the whole people of
the nation ...." Mixed Claims Commission, supra note 50, at 190. It was clearly foreseen
that the national interest might require a state to compromise or waive a claim. Id. at 36.
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Against this background, it is still argued that allowing individuals a
direct remedy against states under international law and ending their de-
pendence on governmental presentation of claims would achieve the
goals of enhancing private rights and expanding international com-
merce.64 This policy is thought to have several advantages. First, it
would protect the interests of persons whose governments will not pres-
ent their claims and the interests of stateless persons on whose behalf no
government may present a claim. If private remedies were expanded,
respect for individual rights and welfare could gain in importance rela-
tive to the political calculus of states.65 Second, direct resolution of dis-
putes by private persons, often large corporations that are capable of
presenting their claims vigorously, might remove a source of discord
among states.66 In fact, states in the past have entitled individuals by
treaty to press claims directly in international tribunals. 67
Establishing a direct international remedy against states has the poten-
tial of broadening the scope of private rights in the future.68 However,
prospects for moving in that direction are uncertain. A World Bank-
sponsored convention,69 a notable attempt to build a system of routine
arbitration between private entities and states, has been a disappoint-
ment. In its first twenty years of operation, very few disputes have been
resolved under its auspices, and only a small circle of highly industrial-
ized nations have become signatories. 70
Critical to the success of such efforts to enhance individual rights is
agreement and amity among states. These conditions, however, are diffi-
cult to create and maintain. Private commercial disputes are a recurring
64. See supra note 47.
65. See, e.g., 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 46, at 7-8; McDougal, Lasswell &
Chen, supra note 38, at 636-37; Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 458.
66. Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 454; Jessup, supra note 40, at 908. See also Borchard,
The Access of Individuals to International Courts, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 364 (1930).
67. Mixed Arbitral Tribunals (composed of judges from the two nations involved and a
neutral country, to prevent stalemate) established by the Treaty of Versailles and the Arbitral
Tribunal of Upper Silesia (between Germany and Poland in 1922) are instances in which
states, by agreement, have given private claimants direct access against foreign states. See 2 F.
GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 46, at 529-31.
68. See Lauterpacht, supra note 38, at 113-16.
69. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 2 U.S.T. 570, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
70. Although the United States has signed the convention, such frameworks for dispute
resolution are still exceptional and do not receive the support of many nations. See 3 A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS
616-17, n. a (1983) (only eleven disputes have been submitted to arbitration under the Conven-
tion); Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of In-
ternational Law Under Attack, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 363 (1975) (describing the opposition
of developing countries to the World Bank Convention and other systems enforcing state
responsibility).
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source of international disruption, leaving troublesome disputes under
the control of private claimants, which could block favorable political
accommodation and harm many other individuals and commercial trans-
actions. Conversely, state prerogative, though sacrificing private control
in a specific instance, may improve political relations, thereby fostering
the peaceful, private resolution of the majority of commercial disputes.
As Professor H. Lauterpacht has observed, "the capacity of [individual]
enforcement [in the international commercial arena] must be answered
pragmatically by reference to the given situation and to the relevant in-
ternational instrument. ' 71 On a specific occasion, a state's decision to
subordinate its national's interest is justified by the opportunity to bring
about, through improved relations and possibly a formal agreement, the
private rights conducive to healthy commerce and individual well-being.
In the sphere of international claims settlement, therefore, it is "the in-
tention of States. . ." that should govern,72 for without a modicum of
political support and agreement, private rights have no chance to
flourish.
Diplomatic involvement, in pursuit of an entire nation's interests as
well as private claimants' satisfaction, plays several additional roles.
First, it screens out frivolous claims-those that allege nominal damages
or are intended to embarrass foreign states-and those that allege no vio-
lation of international law.73 Second, diplomats will often prefer to nego-
tiate with their counterparts in a given country, and enter into one
agreement, rather than deal with a large group of private claimants who
could demand divergent settlements. 74 Third, state espousal, in addition
71. Lauterpacht, supra note 38, at 97.
72. Id. at 112. Professor McDougal and his associates, vigorous advocates of private con-
trol of claims against states, nonetheless acknowledge that "[a]t times . . . the state interest,
asserted from perspectives of the total foreign policy of the state, may be in contravention of
the wishes of the individuals concerned." McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 38, at 560.
In light of their strong support for individual rights, this observation may be seen as a further
motivation for assuring private control and prohibiting state intrusion. At the same time, the
writers recognize that the bolstering of individual rights would not eliminate the salutary role
of states in protecting individuals. Id. at 637. It is not clear from their article how Professors
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen would resolve a conflict between private interests and a bona
fide state interest in a particular claims settlement. This Article suggests that legal rules
should give priority to the government in such a case.
73. Sohn & Baxter, supra note 57, at 580 (Art. 25 and Explanatory Note) (a government's
"screening" function is part of its duty "to maintain good relations with a foreign
State .. "). See also E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 351; 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGESr oF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1223 (1967). Professor Lauterpacht recognizes that limiting the asser-
tion of claims to those of sufficient weight and merit is an important goal, but believes that this
will not be a serious problem if direct private action is allowed, since the costs of frivolous
lawsuits would be prohibitive. Lauterpacht, supra note 39, at 454-55, 458.
74. 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 46, at 13. By way of example, American
citizens, following damage to their property caused by the Gut Dam, took steps to recover




to bolstering private claims and simplifying the task of states, also in-
troduces an element of equity into international dispute resolution. For-
mal diplomatic settlement discourages powerful private claimants from
obtaining preferential settlements at the expense of weaker creditors, 75
and puts the formidable weight of the government behind otherwise out-
matched and vulnerable private claimants. 76 Formal settlement by either
a lump sum payment or an arbitral commission could reduce inequalities
in bargaining power.
Contemporary international law thus places national political interests
above private control. It is against this backdrop of governmental discre-
tion in international law, permitting state settlement of private claims in
disregard of the actions or wishes of the private claimants, that the Presi-
dent's power to settle claims in the domestic sphere may be fruitfully
analyzed.
C. Espousal of Private Claims in Domestic Law
Although under international law states have wide latitude to compro-
mise private claims and enter settlements binding on private claimants,
the same legal rules need not prevail in domestic law.77 For example, a
nation might pass a law permitting settlement of claims only at full value,
or preventing settlement without the claimants' consent. 78 Under such a
government of Canada. Commentators attributed the failure of this effort to an inability to
coordinate their activities and interests. "Negotiations between Canada and an association
formed by the claimants were undertaken in 1953-54, but were unsuccessful. Since not all
claimants were members of the association, it could offer Canada a settlement of only part of
the claims, and that was unacceptable." Kerley & Goodman, The Gut Dam Claims-A Lump
Sum Settlement Disposes of an Arbitrated Dispute, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 307 (1970). A
similar problem would beset a government if it could not speak for all claimants. The Ameri-
can claimants in this case apparently had negotiated privately. Had the United States stepped
in to espouse their claims, however, any settlement reached would have been binding under
international law.
75. For instance, a powerful private enterprise might try to extract from a decaying gov-
ernment-or an unstable new government-concessions or compensation unavailable to
smaller enterprises and detrimental to their interests. Diplomatic protection would sweep in
all claims and mitigate such inequalities.
76. See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 57, at 580 (Art. 25 and Explanatory Note).
77. For example, it traditionally has been held that both espousal of a claim and determi-
nation of its validity and amount are matters of international law, while distribution of an
award is a matter of domestic law. See, eg., Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 212-13,
(1828) (holding assignee in bankruptcy to be entitled under American law to receive award of
claims tribunal established by the United States and Spain); Clark, Legal Aspects Regarding
the Ownership and Distribution of Awards, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1913). In actual practice,
the line between claim espousal/valuation and distribution is blurred. Under lump sum claim
settlements, for example, the claim is espoused internationally, yet its validity and value are
determined by a national tribunal. See supra note 9 (discussing the operation of the FCSC).
See generally R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL
COMMISSIONS (1962).
78. One commentator has actually suggested putting an affirmative duty on the govern-
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law, private claimants could resort to domestic courts to compel or pre-
vent action taken by their governments or seek damages if a claim has
been settled disadvantageously. 79
A domestic legal regime subordinating governmental discretion to the
autonomy of private claimants gives rise to an obvious difficulty. The
narrow legal constraints of a private legal settlement could prevent the
government from reaching a binding settlement of claims that would
ameliorate relations or forestall their deterioration.80 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the international law of espousal, giving the government
control over private claims, has been absorbed in its essential aspects into
United States law.8' Traditional theories of claim "transformation" or
"merger" have been accepted by some,82 but more recent affirmations of
the claim settlement power have emphasized the practical element of
"control. '8 3 The distinction is not critical, however, as demonstrated by
the draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. It
ment, as the agent of private claimants, to settle claims at full value and making it a breach of
that duty to waive a claim without the consent of the private claimant. Bannerman, Constitu-
tional Issues in the Settlement of Property Claims Against Foreign States, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1123-24 (1975). This position understates the difficulty of proving a lack of diligent effort
by the government and ignores the drawbacks of importing strict legal duties into the realm of
diplomacy.
79. The difficulty of proving damages from a waiver or partial settlement of a claim would
be substantial, due to the speculative nature of a private claim against a foreign government.
This is especially true when international relations have soured, reducing the chance for direct
recovery without diplomatic involvement. See Brownstein, The Takings Clause and the Ira-
nian Claims Settlement, 29 UCLA L. REv. 984, 1012-17 (1982). Under existing law, however,
"disappointed claimants have no right of judicial review as to the validity and amount of their
[lump sum] awards, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary." R. LILLICH, supra note
77, at 64 (emphasis in original).
80. See Comment, Blocked Assets and Private Claims: The Initial Barriers to Trade Nego-
tiations Between the United States and China, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 449 (1973).
81. When a suit was brought against Mexico for the expropriation of property granted to
the United States as part of an international claims settlement, a United States court, in dis-
missing the action, affirmed the continuing power of states to extinguish private claims:
"Under well-established principles of international law, a sovereign power possesses the abso-
lute power to assert the private claims of its nationals against another sovereign. . . This
authority to espouse claims does not depend on the consent of the private claimholder...
Once it has espoused the claim, the sovereign has wide-ranging discretion [to]. . .compro-
mise it, seek to enforce it, or waive it entirely." Association de Reclamates v. United Mexican
States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); See also 8 M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 73, at 1216-33; RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, §§ 212, 213; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
A AIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262-63 (1972).
82. See, eg., Germany's Obligations and the Jurisdiction of this Commission as Deter-
mined by Nationality of Claims and Admin. Dec. no. V, Mixed Claims Comm., U.S. and
Germany 145, 153 (Oct. 21, 1924) (U.S. Comm'ner Anderson) ("It is the settled law of the
United States that by espousing a claim of an American national, and seeking redress on his
behalf against a foreign government, the United States makes the claim its own. The United
States has thereafter complete possession and control of the claim ...."); Note, Settlement of
the Hostage Crisis, supra note 23, at 1044-46 (arguing that the claim "merger" theory repre-
sents contemporary United States law).
83. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 53, at 536-37, 539-42, 542 n.57 (suggesting, with
310
Executive Claims Settlement
states unabashedly that the government "may refuse to present a claim,
settle it by negotiation, abandon it, or join it with other claims for en bloc
resolution . *... ,84
1. The Legal Setting for Claims Settlement
Judicial endorsement of the federal government's power to settle
claims emerges from several lines of case law. Courts have sanctioned
and reinforced governmental discretion by (1) denying compensation
under the fifth amendment 5 to American claimants dissatisfied with a
particular settlement; (2) permitting Congress and the executive to with-
hold distribution of awards for allegedly fraudulent claims against for-
eign states; and (3) declining to review the awards made by national and
international commissions pursuant to binding settlement agreements.
The domestic law of claims settlement, emerging from these opinions,
justifies the binding termination of ongoing lawsuits, an action that may
be necessary to promote the nation's interest in less volatile international
relations.
a. Denial of Compensation Under the Fifth Amendment
The first noteworthy compensation case was Meade v. United States,86
in which Richard Meade, an American claimant against Spain, had failed
to secure an award from a claims commission that had been established
by a treaty between Spain and the United States.87 Although Meade had
earlier sought assistance from the United States in receiving an un-
secured judgment from a separate Spanish tribunal, the Claims Commis-
sion did not recognize that judgment. The Court of Claims denied
compensation for loss of the claim since the government had created an
alternative remedy in the Claims Commission, which had the sole au-
thority to grant an award. In discussing the government's underlying
power over the claim, the court observed that the government "proba-
some circularity, that any claim injuring the government's interests "is intergovernmental
from the outset").
84. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 902 comments i and m (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) (reaffirming traditional claim transforma-
tion principles but recognizing that some private elements remain, e.g., the ability to effect
espousal through a private compromise of the claim). See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 comment g, note 8 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1983) (setting out the pattern of denying compensation under domestic law for claims
settled unfavorably).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
86. 2 Ct. Cl. 224 (1866), affid, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 691 (1869).
87. For a discussion of the case, see W. COWLES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 200-10 (1941).
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bly" could not subject Meade's "claim to the terms and conditions of the
treaty [without his consent]." 88 Meade, however, had sought the govern-
ment's assistance, so he was subject to its political judgment.
The Supreme Court, affirming the denial of compensation, modified
the Court of Claims's cautious attitude toward the government's power
to settle claims. The Supreme Court observed initially that "the claimant
...did invoke the aid of the United States in collecting his claims
" . .,,89 This detail reinforced the Court's decision in favor of the
government, since a claimant who requested the government's aid in set-
tling his claim should be subject to the potential disadvantages of polit-
ical assistance-namely, a settlement not entirely consistent with his
wishes-as well as the potential benefits. Yet the Supreme Court em-
ployed broader language than had the Court of Claims, indicating that
regardless of a claimant's attitude toward diplomatic protection, the
claimant lacked the power to deprive the government of settlement au-
thority by resorting to a private remedy. 90 This decision suggests that
private claimants should not be allowed to frustrate international settle-
ments, even when the claimants have not directly sought government
assistance.91
A settlement of private claims against France, occurring before Meade
was decided but giving rise to controversial litigation afterwards, rein-
forced the rule of governmental discretion. In a treaty with France
signed in 1800,92 the United States agreed to waive the private claims of
Americans for the spoliation of their ships by French vessels enforcing a
blockade against England. In return, France agreed to drop claims that
it had against the United States for reneging on an earlier treaty of
88. 2 Ct. Cl. at 278.
89. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 724.
90. "[T]he proposition [that the government's power is revokable] is wholly inadmissable,
as the effect would be that. . . negotiations [between nations] might be controlled by a single
claimant having some pecuniary interest in the treaty." Id.
91. There are scattered allusions in diplomatic correspondence to limited private control
even after formal involvement by the state, but they confirm the retention of discretionary
settlement power when political interests come into play. See DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 332-33
(1973) (statement of Fabian A. Kwiatek, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims,
U.S. Dept. of State). On one occasion, the Secretary of State wrote that "while the Govern-
ment of the United States no doubt ought to reserve, and certainly will reserve to itself the
right of pursuing such a course as a wise regard to the public interests requires, yet having
originally taken up the subject at the instance of the claimants, and for their benefit, it would
be altogether inexpedient to pursue it, without the attempt at least to obtain their consent
beforehand to the measures adopted." 2 F. WHARTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEsT 549
(1887) (letter from Secretary of State Everett to Mr. Carvallo, Feb. 23, 1853). Even this quali-
fied suggestion of individual control in a claim settlement was quickly retracted, however, and
the Secretary of State explained that "inexpedient" did not mean "indispensable," and that the
government was not at all bound by private wishes. Id. (letter from Secretary of State Everett
to Mr. Carvallo, Mar. 3, 1853).





friendship signed during the American Revolution. 93 The net result of
the settlement was to sacrifice private claims for the sake of an over-
whelming national interest in preserving peace.
In a celebrated case arising out of those events, Gray v. United States, 94
the Court of Claims declared a duty to compensate the private claim-
ant,95 but emphatically endorsed the exercise of political discretion. In
sweeping language, the court also refused to attach any importance to the
claimant's consent and flatly rejected its earlier cautious formulation in
Meade.96 Despite the apparent availability of an alternative remedy in
France,97 the government's authority to close off the private remedy by
waiver-i.e., by a settlement amounting to complete forfeiture-
prevailed over the wishes of private American claimants, even those who
had not formally sought governmental assistance.
The Claims Court recently confronted a similar set of facts. A dissatis-
fied claimant against the People's Republic of China (PRC) contended
that because President Carter had settled a claim against its will in con-
nection with complete recognition of the PRC, it deserved compensation
93. See generally Note, The French Spoliation Cases-An Unanswered Question, 12 VA. J.
INT'L L. 120 (1971) (summarizing the background of the French spoliation claims and their
long history in United States courts).
94. 21 Ct. CL 340 (1886).
95. Id. at 392-93. The Court in Gray could not directly compensate the plaintiffs since its
jurisdiction was limited to giving Congress an advisory opinion on the merits of compensation.
Gray remains the strongest case suggesting that an unfavorable claims settlement is a compen-
sable taking of "property" under the fifth amendment. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 46,
§ 213, Reporter's Note. Recent cases in the Claims Court indicate that the reasoning of Gray
has been rejected, on the apparent ground that although a claim against a government is a
property right, recovery is so problematic that an adverse executive action-especially one in a
traditional area of executive discretion-produces merely a speculative injury that is not com-
pensable. See, eg., Langenegger v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 229, 236 (1984); Shanghai Power
Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 243-47 (1983); Axis Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d
1386, 1392-93 (Ct. Cl. 1970). The advisory holding in Gray may still have some validity, how-
ever, under the unusual circumstances presumed to exist in that case: namely, the foreign
government promises compensation to private claimants but the U.S. government waives their
claims for a purely public interest. See Note, supra note 39, at 123-24; Aris Gloves, 420 F.2d at
1396-97 (Nichols, J., concurring). The slim chance of compensability might not reassure anx-
ious private claimants, but it could serve to discourage highly unfavorable executive settle-
ments, especially when private remedies are available.
96. 21 Ct. Cl. at 392. ("That any Government has the right to [set off French national
claims against American individual claims] as it has the right to refuse war in protection of a
wronged citizen, or to take other action, which, at the expense of the individual, is most benefi-
cial to the whole people, is too clear for discussion.").
97. Id. at 367, 376. In fact, the initial French willingness to pay compensation appeared
to dissipate over time, with the French as well as the Americans demanding a set-off of private
American claims against French national claims. Id. at 377-78. A more compelling basis for
requiring compensation by the United States lay in the repeated assurances of relief by Ameri-
can officials. Id. at 355, 367, 376. In the case of Iran, by contrast, private claimants not only
lacked an effective alternate remedy (since they had no vested right in the property held as
security for their U.S. judgments), but they were in communication with the State Depart-
ment, see 1981 Hearings, supra note 31, at 57-58 (statement of Warren Christopher, former
Deputy Secretary of State), and could not claim to have been misled by American officials.
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for the unsatisfied portion of the claims.98 In Shanghai Power Co. v.
United States, as in Gray, the court recognized the existence of an alter-
native remedy-a federal court action pursuant to the FSIA-yet none-
theless upheld the government's authority to substitute another remedy
by means of a binding claims settlement.99 In justifying the govern-
ment's authority to take control of private claims without compensating
for individual losses, the court recognized that there were substantial
risks, generally known to businessmen, that political changes could inter-
fere with foreign investment.c0 The court stressed that the government's
primary task was to improve political conditions. 10 1 "Americans who
trade . . . abroad rely upon the fabric of relationships established be-
tween our government and others . . .When that fabric is strained or
torn. . . it may not be possible to repair it without sacrificing some pre-
existing rights." 10 2 The government's foremost responsibility was to re-
store the harmonious relations essential to trade in the future. Without
the opportunity for a binding settlement, many other businessmen, and
the nation at large, could be injured.
Implicit in the holdings of fifth amendment cases are two important
ideas, one pragmatic, the other legal. The pragmatic understanding is
that a requirement of compensation would complicate and perhaps pre-
clude important presidential decisions in a moment of international ten-
sion. The possibility of judicial intrusion-ordering the payment of
billions of dollars in damages-would surely hamper effective and deci-
sive action.103 Underpinning the rationale for the non-compensability of
98. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
People's Republic of China Concerning the Settlement of Claims, 30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S.
No. 9306, (May 11, 1979), amended by 31 U.S.T. 5596, T.I.A.S. No. 9675 (Sept. 28, 1979).
See also DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 1213-15 (1979) (recounting the executive agreement under
which the PRC agreed to pay $80.5 million in satisfaction of a total debt of about $196.9
million, yielding claimants approximately forty-one cents per dollar of claims preadjudicated
before the FCSC).
99. Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at 240-41, 243-44. Accord Aris Gloves, 420 F.2d 1386
(denying compensation to owners of factories located in Czechoslovakia and areas of Germany
occupied by American troops but later placed under Soviet control by the Potsdam Agree-
ment). In Aris Gloves, the court rested its argument primarily on the existence of "constnlc-
tive" hostilities at the time and precedents that denied compensation for property losses under
such circumstances. Id. at 1391-92. However, in view of a lump sum agreement with Czecho-
slovakia, providing partial satisfaction through adjudication before the FCSC, id. at 1388-89,
and the government's power to waive claims against foreign states, the case could have been
decided more squarely by upholding the government's claim settlement power.
100. Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at 244-45.
101. Cf. E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271, 274-75 (1983) (holding that al-
leged takings in the area of foreign affairs should be treated no differently than governmental
acts in other areas of policy, yet denying any compensation for the Iranian claims settlement
pending adjudication of claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
102. Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at 245.




claims is the fact of potential governmental control.cI Phrased differ-
ently, the authority of the government to take over a claim and take it
into the political domain at any pressing moment renders a claim's value
too speculative to calculate. The right to a claim against a foreign state is
qualified, and therefore may be unenforceable. To trace the doctrine of
political control in domestic law, it is necessary to move to another body
of case law.
b. The Creation of a National Fund
The government's right to politicize a private claim, thereby subordi-
nating it to diplomatic concerns, comes under the rubric of the "national
fund" doctrine. 10 5 This doctrine emerged from an assortment of cases in
which private claimants sought writs of mandamus ordering the Secre-
tary of State to distribute funds received from foreign governments in
settlement of international claims.106 The Supreme Court refused to
grant writs on the ground that such funds belonged legally to the United
States government.' 0 7 Although private claimants were said to have an
equitable "expectancy of interest in the fund, that is, a possibility coupled
with an interest,"' 08 the Court refrained from interfering in the govern-
ment's discretionary decision as to its distribution. 0 9 Courts have con-
sidered that disbursements by the government to private claimants are
"by way of gratuity, payments as of grace and not of right."" 0
Behind the government's extensive control over the distribution of
policy could frustrate the goals of secrecy and unity in diplomatic negotiations and harm rela-
tions with foreign nations).
104. Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at 244-45, 245 n.14.
105. See R. LILLICH, supra note 77, at 23-40 (giving an overview of the national fund
doctrine in United States law); Brownstein, supra note 79, at 984, 992-98 (offering a critical
assessment of the doctrine's impact on private claimants).
106. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 321-23, 325 (1891); United
States ex rel Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 259 (1888); Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63,
71 (1884); Great Western Insurance Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 206, 216-18, aft'd, 112
U.S. 193 (1884). See also Clark, supra note 77, at 382 (discussing government espousal of
claims and the establishment of a national fund).
For modem restatements of political control, see Seyersted, supra note 46, at 143 (Norway);
J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA
1022-43 (2d ed. 1965) (Canada); RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 213 (United States).
107. See, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 458 (1899) ("As
between the United States and Mexico, indeed as between the United States and American
claimants, the money received from Mexico under the award of the commission was. . . the
property of the United States. .. ").
108. Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 538 (1891) (upholding claim of assignee in bank-
ruptcy to an award of a domestic claims commission established by Congress to make awards
from a national fund paid into by Great Britain under the "Alabama Claims" settlement of
1871).
109. Id. at 537-38.
110. Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457 (1896) (denying the ownership interest of an as-
signee in bankruptcy in a claim against France growing out of the French spoliations of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). Cf. Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529 (1891);
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funds from international claims settlements is its control over the disposi-
tion of private claims. The Court's recognition of this governmental
power is evident in its treatment of the notorious claims of Benjamin
Weil and the La Abra Silver Mining Company, adjudicated by a Mexi-
can-United States claims commission established in 1868.111 After Mex-
ico began its payments under the agreement and the United States
proceeded to transmit them to American claimants, the Mexican govern-
ment learned of the claims' possible fraudulence and sought a rehearing
on their validity. After the United States ceased disbursing the awards,
the claimants sued for their continuation. On the theory that the claims,
though traceable to private claimants, had become international and
political in character, the Court plainly subordinated private interests to
public demands. "Every citizen who asks the intervention of his own
government against another for the redress of his personal grievances
must necessarily subject himself and his claims to [the] requirements of
international comity. 11 2 In a later decision growing out of the same
contested claims, the Court deleted the reference to the request for inter-
vention and stated simply the government's possession of, and authority
over, the claim:
As between nations, the proprietary right in respect to those things be-
longing to private individuals or bodies corporate within a nation's territo-
rial limits is absolute, and the rights of [an individual] cannot be regarded
as distinct from those of his government. The government assumed the re-
sponsibility of presenting his claim, and made it its own in seeking redress
in respect to it.1 3
In both traditional and modem doctrines of claims settlement, it is the
act of presenting and settling a claim that critically changes its legal
character by coloring a private claim with diplomatic priorities and ac-
counts for the government's discretion over its disposition.1 14
c. The Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
To ensure the integrity of international settlements, the government
has discretionary authority to withhold awards for dubious claims. The
government also has authority to guarantee the usefulness of those settle-
ments by insulating awards from the challenge of dissatisfied private
Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828) (upholding the interests of assignees in bank-
ruptcy in claim against foreign states).
11I. La Abra Silver, 175 U.S. at 469-500.
112. Id. at 434 (citing Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. at 73).
113. 175 U.S. at 439 (citing United States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. at 323).
114. This may not always have been true. According to one commentator, the Supreme
Court's view of espousal evolved in the course of the nineteenth century from the notion that
the state "represents" a private claim to the theory that it "transforms" a private claim into




claimants. Without that legal safeguard, private claimants could embroil
their governments in a fight over the wisdom of a particular settlement,
and greatly encumber a process designed to facilitate the resolution of
international disputes.
The Supreme Court faced a challenge to an arbitral award in Z. & F.
Assets Corp. v. Hull." 5 The Court's decision shielded the government's
control of the process of settling claims from the potentially debilitating
effect of private interference.' 16 In Z. & F. Assets, private claimants who
had already received awards from the United States-German Mixed
Claims Commission opposed the rehearing and acceptance of other
claims, since any further awards would dilute the value of their share of a
limited fund. The Court rejected their request for an injunction barring
distribution of the challenged awards on the ground that the act of sub-
mitting the claims to international adjudication had converted a private
claim into one between the two governments. 117 While Chief Justice
Hughes's opinion for the Court was argued narrowly, resting on a statute
giving the Secretary of State discretion over the certification and payment
of international arbitral awards," 8 the concurring opinion of Justice
Black and the opinions of the lower courts were broader. 1 9 Justice
Black, joined by Justice Douglas, maintained that private claimants had
no avenue of relief in domestic courts, as their settled claims had become
"the subject of a diplomatic controversy between the United States and
Germany."' 120 Under either theory, the government possessed authority
to block the interference of private claimants with the settlement of a
claim.121
The thread running through this body of case law is political control.
This control is essential to the legal validity of a transfer of claims to an
arbitral tribunal and the alleged infringement on federal court jurisdic-
tion. First, it is apparent that the United States may settle a claim (with-
out the necessity of compensation) even when an alternate remedy exists.
Second, public settlement subordinates a claim to perceived diplomatic
115. 311 U.S. 470 (1941).
116. Accord Meade v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 691 (1869) (holding that the Court
of Claims lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of domestic claims tribunal, denying the
validity of a claim against Spain); see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
117. 311 U.S. at 487.
118. Id. at 489. See supra note 77 (ownership of claims is a domestic law issue subject to
ordinary judicial resolution whereas the government's separate power to enter binding claims
settlements is a political matter).
119. 31 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1940), afid, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
120. 311 U.S. at 492-93 (Black, J., concurring).
121. The importance of securing claims settlement from private challenge is reflected in 22
U.S.C. § 1623(h) (1982), which bars judicial review of determinations of the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. See, e.g., American & European Agencies, Inc. v. Gillilland, 247 F.2d
95 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (broadly applying the ban on judicial review of FCSC valuations).
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needs, thereby removing private control. After a settlement, therefore, a
domestic court does iot lose jurisdiction over the same private claim, but
rather, faces a substantially different claim, one that is no longer tied to
the interests and wishes of private parties.
Language employed many years ago by the Court of Claims, in re-
jecting the argument that the government acted simply as trustee of a
private claim, illustrates the legal principle that obviates the jurisdic-
tional problem presented by a claims settlement:
When the national government urged upon Great Britain the demands of
American citizens, . . . those demands . . passed out of the region of
mere private right into the domain of international law, and out of the
hands of the citizen into those of his government. . .. [After presentation
of the claim] there existed no private claims of American citizens against
Great Britain for the depredations of the rebel cruisers; they were all obliter-
ated by the act of the United States as a sovereign, in demanding and receiv-
ing satisfaction therefor. 122
Though such a stark expression of the claim transformation theory is
rare in contemporary legal discourse, it is not inconsistent with the cur-
rent view, according to which the government assumes control over a
claim by taking it into the realm of diplomacy. However it is character-
ized, the government's authority in foreign affairs encompasses the power
to settle a dispute in the course of private litigation and bind possibly
resistant nationals. Once this authority is recognized, the method of set-
tlement is not critical.123  For example, the government's authority to
enter a binding settlement of claims has been as valid when the settle-
ment resulted from adjudication by an international commission as when
it resulted from adjudication by a national commission. 124
122. Great Western Insurance Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 206, 217-18, afid, 112 U.S.
193 (1884) (emphasis added) (denying claim against the residue of a fund paid into by Great
Britain in connection with the "Alabama Claims" settlement and only partially distributed by
a domestic claims commission).
123. Diplomatic protection includes an array of remedial techniques. See Note, Executive
Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 156 n.2. In the words of Professor Dunn regarding
diplomatic protection in the case of citizens abroad: "the subject of diplomatic protection of
citizens abroad embraces generally all cases of official representation by one government on
behalf of its citizens or their property interests within the jurisdiction of another. . . ." 2 F.
DUNN, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF AMERICANS IN MEXICO 2 (1933). In a 1961 memoran-
dum, the Department of State provided for three specific means of settlement: (1) compensa-
tion through diplomatic submission of individual claims; (2) lump sum settlements with
national adjudication of individual claims; and (3) submission of claims to an international
arbitral tribunal. These methods were distinguished from "espousal," whose precise meaning
was left unclear. Kerley, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law: International Claims, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 165, 167 (1962). Professor Lillich, by contrast,
viewed the first option-settlement through diplomatic negotiation-as espousal, and distin-
guished the remaining two. R. LILLICH, supra note 30, at 167.
124. Compare, e.g., Z & F Assets, 311 U.S. 470 (United States-German Mixed Claims




Similarly, the government assumes control over claims both when its
agent actually argues the cases before an international commission and
when private claimants control the presentation before national commis-
sions.125 The essential element is not a procedural formality, but the
creation of an alternate remedy by international agreement.1 26 It is the
power to take over a private claim that underpins the United States gov-
ernment's authority to reach a binding settlement agreement.
Two issues stand in the way of complete acceptance of the espousal
doctrine in domestic law: (1) the proper institutional roles of the Presi-
dent and Congress in settling claims; and (2) the right of claimants to
seek private remedies in domestic courts, which in turn may interfere
with the executive's effort to settle a claim.
With respect to the separation of powers, both historical practice and
judicial decisions support an independent executive power to settle
claims by executive agreement as well as treaty. In view of unbroken
historical practice approved by the judiciary, it is unnecessary to attach
an uninformative label, such as "inherent" or "implied" constitutional
power, to justify the executive's authority. 127 The executive has long ex-
ercised the power to settle claims; the only, but by no means unimpor-
tant, institutional question is whether Congress has taken any steps to
withdraw or restrict that power.
(lump sum agreement with PRC, established by executive agreement in 1979). See also Stewart
& Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, in THE
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 1981-1983, at 13-14 (R. Lillich ed. 1984) (noting
that a lump sum settlement is anticipated for claims of less than $250,000). But see Marschalk
Co., 518 F. Supp. at 88, in which Judge Duffy wrote that "[tihere is no settlement of a case
where the adjudication of the rights of the parties is merely transferred to another forum."
This view disregards the common procedures by which states render diplomatic protection to
private claims in the international setting.
125. The Office of the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State apparently takes a
different view. It maintains that the private claims against Iran have not been espoused, but
rather, have been simply transferred, as shown by the capacity of individual claimants to pres-
ent their cases directly before the Claims Tribunal. While previous international claims com-
missions restricted the presentation of cases to government agents, see A. FELLER, THE
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, 1923-1924, at 287-88 (1934), the view of the Deputy Legal
Adviser is overly formalistic. Unless a lump sum agreement is reached, the United States will
directly present claims for less than $250,000 to the Tribunal. Stewart & Sherman, supra note
124, at 6, 13. Given the government's complete discretion over any remedy, the Claims Tribu-
nal is simply a form of diplomatic protection, or governmental settlement of claims.
126. Instead of drawing fine terminological distinctions, it is more helpful to view diplo-
matic protection in the form of claims settlement power as a basis of an "agreement on specific
procedure for settlement. . . ." Wetter, supra note 32, at 324. See also Christenson, supra
note 53, at 532. The crucial point is that the government may remove control of the claim
from the private claimant once a procedure is established to pay valid claims or a direct pay-
ment is made. See, e.g., id. at 536-37, 541-42; R. LILLICH, supra note 30, at 200.
127. For a summary of the classic debate over the "sole organ" and "concurrent author-
ity" theories of executive foreign affairs power, see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1957, at 207-14 (1984).
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Congress, in fact, has taken no action that casts doubt on the distinct,
well-established executive authority to settle claims. On the contrary, it
has flatly rejected attempts to alter the executive's institutional role in the
espousal of claims against foreign states. In the face of congressional reti-
cence, there is no need to cast doubt on the executive's power or rum-
mage through sparse legislative history for its source, as the Court did in
Dames & Moore. 128
2. The Historical Basis of Executive Power
Claims settlements by the executive have occupied an important place
in American foreign policy. Central to the early diplomacy of the nation
were treaties of amity, which included provisions settling claims for dam-
age to American commercial vessels that had become entangled in Euro-
pean strife. 129 International compacts, such as the one with France in
1800,130 have been an important means of defusing hostilities. Claims of
American nationals have been settled by executive agreements as well as
by treaties.131 The first settlement by executive agreement was with the
Netherlands in 1799.132 Settlement by the executive continued through-
out the nineteenth century. 133
Thus resting on a solid historical foundation, executive claims settle-
ments have continued through the present as a normal diplomatic prac-
tice. In the nineteenth century, both mixed claims commissions and
lump sum agreements (with valuation by national commissions) were
common.134 In the twentieth century, mixed claims commissions gave
128. 453 U.S. at 677, 680-82, 688.
129. See, eg., Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-
Great Britain, art. VII, 2 U.S.T. 245, T.I.A.S. No. 105 (Jay Treaty); Treaty of Friendship,
Limits, and Navigation, Oct. 27, 1795, United States-Spain, art. XXI, 2 U.S.T. 318, T.I.A.S.
No. 325.
130. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
131. There has been no clear rationale governing the choice of treaty or executive agree-
ment, except to the extent that many of the treaties have involved reciprocal claims against the
United States, requiring congressional appropriation of funds. Treaty ratification would foster
congressional support for the arrangement. See Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20
POL. Sci. Q. 385, 399-403 (1905); but see McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional Exec-
utive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE
L.J. 181, 269-70 (1945). Executive agreements settling strictly American claims lacked that
rationale for congressional participation.
132. Settlement of the Case of the Schooner "Wilmington Packet," Dec. 7, 1799, United
States-Netherlands, 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1075 (H. Miller ed. 1937).
133. For an exhaustive list of claims settlement agreements by executive agreement as well
as by treaty through United States history, see Brief for Intervenor, Bank Markazi Iran at
Appendix A, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See also Moore, supra note 131,
at 399-408; Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 80-82, 244
(1922); McDougal & Lans, supra note 131, at 273-77.





way after World War II to lump sum agreements dispensed by the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission. 135 The Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal thus harks back to a post-World War II form of claims settle-
ment. 136 Claims settlements by executive agreement have not lost their
significance or regularity, even as the volume of private litigation against
states has grown. 137
Given the deep-rooted nature of independent executive power to settle
claims, the Court's search in Dames & Moore for a legislative grant of
authority was unnecessary. By conducting that search without setting
the government's action in the context of the extensive law of claims set-
tlement, the Court was forced to tease strained meanings out of scattered
congressional actions and to rest executive power on the shaky founda-
tion of congressional acquiescence. The approach presented here shows
that executive power to settle claims need not rely on a implied congres-
sional delegations of authority.
a. Congressional Acceptance of Executive Authority
Although the approach in Dames & Moore was overly cautious and
cast needless doubt on executive authority, the Court's reading of con-
gressional action was not inaccurate. Congressional acts touching on
claims settlement have confirmed the executive's predominant institu-
tional role.
In 1963, a resolution was introduced in Congress requesting that inter-
national claims settlement agreements be submitted to the Senate as trea-
ties if a national commission, such as the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, had already adjudicated the claims. 138 The resolution did
not cover all settlement agreements, but only those that had been so adju-
dicated. Presumably, settlements arranged under emergency conditions
were exempt, since mandatory Senate approval might impede executive
action in a crisis. The necessity of disclosing secret negotiations and de-
laying an agreement so that a treaty could be ratified would severely re-
135. See 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 46, at 3-4, 30, 33; see also supra note 9.
136. Commentators differ as to the proper classification of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. Professor Sohn views it in the light of prior tribunals, see Sohn, The Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal: Jurisprudential Contributions to the Development of International
Law, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 1981-83, at 92 (R. Lillich ed. 1984),
while Professor Lowenfeld has pointed to its novelty, see 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 70, at
616-17. A more realistic assessment is that the Tribunal is a hybrid, adjudicating public claims
that also appear to be private, see Jones, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Private
Rights and State Responsibility, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 259 (1984), and having the form of a tradi-
tional mixed commission although applying rules of private commercial arbitration. See
Carter, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Observations on the First Year, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 1076, 1076-80, 1084-85 (1982).
137. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-81, 681 n.9 (list of ten claims settlement agree-
ments entered by the executive since 1952).
138. S. RES. 2403, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REc. 25, 148-49 (1963).
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duce the likelihood of a claims settlement. Moreover, the
constitutionality of a congressional statute that compels submission of
claims settlement agreements as treaties is doubtful.1 39
Congress next took action affecting the executive's power to enter in-
ternational agreements in 1971 when it passed legislation requiring the
Secretary of State to submit to Congress the text of all executive agree-
ments "as soon as practicable" after they have taken effect. 140 The bill's
legislative history expressly states that "[t]he right of the President to
conclude executive agreements is not in question"; the legislation's sole
purpose was disclosure. 141 With regard to claim settlements in particu-
lar, the sponsor of the legislation recognized that Congress had "ac-
cepted the right of the President, one individual, acting through his
diplomatic force, to adjudicate and settle claims of American nationals
against foreign countries . ... 42
The FSIA, passed in 1976, made no reference to claims settlement
agrements. 143 In extensive hearings on the legislation, public officials and
scholars testified that a private remedy in domestic courts did not sup-
plant the role of national claims settlement; 44 diplomatic settlement and
private law suits were meant to be complementary.145 Congress's recog-
nition of executive power was reiterated one year later with passage of
139. See Matthews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L. J. 344, 384 (1955) (denying Congress's power to limit the executive
agreement power when national interests are threatened); but see Berger, The Presidential Mo-
nopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972) (denying constitutional validity to
executive agreements and thus implicitly permitting congressional restrictions).
140. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1982).
141. H.R. REP. No. 1301, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3067, 3070.
142. Transmittal of Executive to Congress: Hearings on S. 596 Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1971) (statement of Sen. Case).
143. Congress made FSIA subject only to existing international agreements, not future
agreements. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (1982). This does not imply that all future executive
agreements, for example, on claims settlement, are barred. But see Marschalk Co. v. Iran
Nat'l. Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Instead, it was merely intended
to ensure that ad hoc executive agreements with respect to immunity from suit did not
reemerge as an impediment to ordinary commercial litigation. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts
in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(1973).
144. See Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1973) (statement of Bruno Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Division, Dept. of Justice)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]; id. at 26, 31 (statement of Charles Brower, Acting Legal
Adviser, Dept. of State).
145. The Supreme Court held that FSIA restricted executive discretion with respect to
sovereign immunity determinations but did not prohibit the executive's claims settlement
power. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685-86. Judge Breyer, however, was more troubled that
FSIA, by providing an alternate mechanism for resolving commercial disputes with foreign
governments, had weakened the legal foundation beneath binding executive claims settlements.
Chas. T Main Int'l, 651 F.2d at 817-18, 818 n.5 (concurring opinion).
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IEEPA, whose legislative history expressly disavows any attempt to limit
the President's power to settle claims. 146
Judicial support for independent executive authority comes from the
controversial case of Pink v. United States,147 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a claims settlement with the Soviet Union. Under the "Lit-
vinov Assignment," the United States waived claims of American citi-
zens for nationalization of their property in exchange for an assignment
to the United States of property in the United States seized by the Soviet
Union under expropriation decrees. Out of this "assigned" property the
United States was to pay off the claims of American nationals through
adjudication by a national commission. 148
Despite the serious question whether Soviet decrees had any force over
property held lawfully in this country, the Supreme Court upheld the
interest of the United States in the assignment over the interests of pri-
vate claimants.' 49 In the process, the Court developed a theory of in-
dependent executive claims settlement power as an incident of the
President's authority under Article II of the Constitution to recognize
foreign nations. I50 Such agreements were deemed to be critical to the
nation's foreign policy, a view that strongly favored independent execu-
tive authority. 151
The Pink case has been relied on heavily by litigants both defending
and contesting executive claims settlement power. One of President
Carter's chief assistants, deeply involved in the hostage release negotia-
tions, looked to this case as the strongest foundation for the U.S.-Iran
settlement agreement.' 52 The respondents in Dames & Moore, the Ira-
nian and U.S. governments, opened their defense of presidential claims
146. S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4540, 4544.
147. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
148. See 22 U.S.C. § 1641d(a) (1982) (providing for adjudication of pre-1933 claims
against the Soviet Union by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission).
149. See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
150. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31; Pink 315 U.S. at 229-30. The President's constitutional
authority to "recognize" foreign sovereigns is not explicit and rests on a vague conferral of
authority to receive ambassadors. Through actual practice this grant of authority has become
equivalent to an "inherent" constitutional power to recognize or withdraw recognition from
foreign nations. See L. HENKIN, supra note 81, at 41-42.
151. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Pink, recognized the need for executive
maneuverability:
Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals
• . . certainly is a modest implied power of the President. . . . Effectiveness in handling
the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless such a power exists, the
power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted.
315 U.S. at 229-30 (citations omitted).
152. Emergency Economic Powers: Iran: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1981) (statement of Lloyd Cutler).
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settlement power with citations to Pink.153
If the language of the Court in Pink is read strictly, presidential claims
settlement power is confined to settlements incident to recognition. Such
a construction, however, is too narrow. Immediately after upholding the
settlement power exercised in connection with recognition, the Court
broadened executive settlement power to include an agreement con-
nected with any "rehabilitation of relations between this country and an-
other nation." 154 Drawing a distinction between recognition of a new
government and restoration of friendly relations, for the purpose of fenc-
ing in executive discretion, is impractical and unwise.155 In a concurring
opinion in Pink, Justice Frankfurter did not even suggest a confinement
of executive claims settlement power.156 No rational line could be
drawn. 157
Commentators who criticize executive discretion, and applaud such
congressional efforts as the Gravel Amendment' 58-which used congres-
sional leverage over trade legislation to block a claims settlement with
Czechoslovakia-still recognize as unchanged the constitutional alloca-
tion of claims settlement power to the President. 59 The President's dis-
cretionary authority to settle private claims remains unimpaired.
b. The Rights of Private Litigants
Pink also lends support to the executive's independent authority to in-
tervene in ongoing litigation. The case not only stands for the rule that
executive agreements, like treaties, take priority over state law, but also
153. Brief for Intervenor, Bank Markazi Iran, at 16 and Brief for the United States at 40,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
154. 315 U.S. at 230.
155. But see Note, Executive Claims Settlement Power, supra note 9, at 184-85 (condition-
ing the exclusivity of executive claims settlement authority on the contemporaneity of
"recognition").
156. 315 U.S. at 240-41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
157. Other courts, both before and after Pink, have upheld the executive's independent
power to settle claims as it deems appropriate. Furthermore, this power was not treated as
limited by the Constitution or in practice to particular types of foreign policy contexts. See
Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951). For instance, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, when faced with a challenge to the United States's claim under the
Litvinov assignment, upheld without hesitation the President's right to settle claims, stating
that, "The President. . .is entrusted with the right of conducting all negotiations with foreign
governments and is the judge of the expediency of instituting, conducting, or terminating such
negotiations in respect to claims against foreign governments. Agreements of such claims are
not submitted to the Senate." Russia v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 69 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.
1934). A district court upheld an executive claims settlement with Bulgaria, simply stating
that "the settling of claims of United States citizens against foreign countries is within the
implied powers given to the Executive by the Constitution." Avramova v. United States, 354
F. Supp. 420, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
158. Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress
Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837 (1975).
159. Id. at 844.
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upholds executive power to enter a binding claims settlement that cuts off
an otherwise viable private remedy.160 The actions of alien claimants in
New York were effectively terminated when the Supreme Court enforced
an executive claims settlement, affirming the federal government's inter-
est in disputed property needed to satisfy private claims. 61  Lower
courts, following that decision, have swept away not only the remedies of
foreign creditors but also the actions of state-appointed receivers and pri-
vate American claimants asserting rights after a claims settlement has
taken legal effect. 162
The Supreme Court in Pink reinforced the executive's independent
power to enter a binding settlement that interferes with private judicial
remedies. Lower courts have grounded their deference to executive
claims settlements on the "political question" doctrine, 163 and have held
that actions demanding or rejecting a presentation of claims are not cog-
nizable in domestic court.164 This applies to suits against foreign govern-
ments as well as against the United States, for in both instances an
executive settlement may take away private control and move the claim
into the public domain of diplomacy. The initiation of a lawsuit does not
empower private claimants to veto the nation's foreign policy.165 While
some private maneuverability remains,1 66 it is limited and subject to ter-
0
160. See R. LILLICH, supra note 30, at 87 ("where diplomacy has functioned . . . the
courts may be closed to individual litigants in the interest of all claimants .. ").
161. Pink was problematic in its enforcement of Soviet expropriation decrees against prop-
erty held in the United States. In 1942, enforcement of the Litvinov assignment was not inte-
gral to the nation's foreign policy. The Supreme Court could have upheld the rights of foreign
creditors without political repercussions, but instead went to great lengths-even to the point
of applying Soviet law as interpreted by a Soviet official at the request of the Court-to defeat
those rights. Justice Douglas's dismissal of fifth amendment due process protection for foreign
creditors was certainly troubling. 315 U.S. at 228. Cf. Russia v. Nat'l City Bank of New York,
69 F.2d at 47-48 (upholding, at the time of entering the Litvinov assignment, the President's
right to settle claims).
162. See, e.g., United States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583, 589-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), ajfd, modified in part, 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1947); Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co., 58
F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
163. Courts have denied declaratory and injunctive relief to private claimants who sued to
compel satisfaction of claims in a manner deemed politically unwise. See, e.g., Logan v. Secre-
tary of State, 553 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Redpath v. Kissinger, 415 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.
Tex.) afl'd, 545 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to issue writ of mandamus compelling the
extension of diplomatic protection to an American imprisoned abroad). Courts have also re-
fused to order espousal after the State Department declined to do so. See e.g., United States ex
rel. Holzendorf v. Hay, 194 U.S. 373, 375 (1904). Courts in a variety of contexts have declined
to review executive actions affecting international relations, above all when the actions rested
on discretionary decisions as to proper negotiating posture. See, e.g., Adams v. Vance, 570
F.2d 950, 954-56 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
164. See, e.g., Z. & F. Assets Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 487 (1941). If this view were
expanded, it would defeat any right private claimants might have to litigate a claim in spite of
executive espousal, the very issue presented in Dames & Moore.
165. See Meade, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 724-25.
166. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, at § 211 comment a ("under normal conditions" a
United States citizen could not be prevented "from seeking reparation from . . . the foreign
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mination by an executive settlement 1 67
If a private claimant could reject the government's settlement by
choosing a private remedy that was deemed inviolable, the executive
branch's settlement power would be meaningless. The inability of the
executive to enter a binding settlement would greatly reduce the value to
the foreign government of dealing with U.S. officials. A choice of reme.
dies-in essence a private claimant's veto power over a diplomatic settle-
ment-would likely result in no public settlement at all. An individual
claimant might upset a delicate arrangement that balanced numerous in-
terests at once, such as that in the Iranian crisis. One group of claimants
might thus injure not only the interests of another group but also the
interests of the entire nation. Effective execution of national foreign pol-
icy requires an executive claims settlement power that includes the ca-
pacity to provide one remedy-be it an international arbitral commission
or lump sum award-and preclude others. The authority to foreclose do-
mestic remedies is a logical extension of the claims settlement power. It
does not revolutionize that power or expand it in a way inconsistent with
rules of international or domestic law.
Critics of the President's power to enter a claims settlement agreement
once litigation has begun have turned to the FSIA for support. 168
Although its drafters envisioned-a continuing, meaningful claims settle-
ment power, the critics maintain that the Act's removal of executive
power over jurisdictional immunity decisions took away all executive
power over domestic litigation.169 This conclusion is unsatisfactory, for
it presupposes that executive control over immunity determinations has
been the sole basis for the executive's involvement in litigation. On the
contrary, such executive involvement has doctrinal and historical roots
in an independent executive claims settlement power, which was neither
created by Congress nor produced by a judicially fashioned rule of deci-
sion. A new rule for sovereign immunity determinations did not eviscer-
state before the United States espouses the claim"). See also supra notes 53-57 and accompa-
nying text.
167. Litigants against Iran are not the only individuals whose private efforts at adjudica-
tion have been disturbed by an international claims settlement. A commentator has observed
that under the mixed arbitral tribunals established by the Treaty of Versailles (regarded favor-
ably by many scholars for their conferral of locus standi on private individuals, see supra note
67) "litigants had. . . been deprived of their rights to resort to the ordinary courts and...
no appeal of any sort lay from the decisions of the Tribunal. ... Note, The Mixed Arbitral
Tribunals Created by the Peace Treaties, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 135, 141-42 (1931).
168. See EDS, 508 F. Supp. at 13-62; Marschalk Co., 518 F. Supp. at 84, 90-92; But see
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685-86, which held that FSIA dealt narrowly with sovereign
immunity decisions and did not silently work a revolutionary change in the President's claims
settlement power.
169. Marschalk Co., 518 F. Supp. at 82-83; EDS, 508 F. Supp. at 1364-65; see also infra




ate the executive's power to take over a claim and settle it-even if it
meant termination of a private lawsuit.
The FSIA has also been invoked to suggest that the initiation of pri-
vate litigation confers on private claimants a right to opt out of, or veto, a
national claims settlement.170 The notion that executive settlement
power is justifiable only in the absence of a domestic remedy, and thereby
is vitiated by sovereign immunity rules that ensure access to a domestic
forum, overlooks the continuity over time of the executive's settlement
power. That power antedates theories of sovereign immunity, 171 which
would deny a domestic remedy altogether, and has been exercised after
adoption of a policy expanding access to U.S. courts. 172 In short, the
claims settlement power does not legally expand and contract in response
to rules of sovereign immunity. It thrives independently of congres-
sionally and judicially fashioned rules ofjurisdiction. The executive's au-
thority was not withdrawn or even challenged by FSIA, even if the Act's
effect was to raise claimants' hope of an alternative to diplomatic
protection.
Above all, the rationale for permitting executive interference in domes-
tic litigation lies in the requirements and purposes of national diplomacy.
To be effective, the President requires independence in negotiation and
the capacity to enter into a binding agreement. The President must be
free to put the national interest above the interests of particular private
claimants. Claims settlement is a practice designed to secure a national
interest, which normally coincides with the full satisfaction of private
claims, 173 though on occasion it might not. The Iranian hostage crisis
was a situation in which national and private interests diverged. The
logic of espousal, in international and domestic law, compelled that na-
tional interest take priority.
The executive's independent authority to intrude in domestic litigation
is not boundless. 174 It is confined to the sphere of claims settlements, in
which the executive's discretionary authority has a firm historical foun-
dation and remains valid law. The authority is also confined to ongoing
litigation not yet reduced to a judgment. Before a determination on the
170. See Marschalk Co., 518 F. Supp. at 83.
171. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (sover-
eign has control over whether to exercise jurisdiction, including over foreign public entities).
172. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-81.
173. See Wetter, supra note 32, at 294 (canvassing exercises of diplomatic protection by
the United States from 1900-1940, concluding that "[o]nce an American citizen possesses
vested rights abroad which are exposed to danger of politically motivated loss or unwarranted
interference, the national will-absent strong reasons to the contrary-normally coincide with
that of the investor.").
174. Several writers have stressed the State Department's adherence to international law
and consultation with private claimants in the settlement of private claims. See, e.g., Wetter,
supra note 32, at 276, 297, and Christenson, supra note 53, at 528, 531-33.
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merits, the claim is still inchoate, and may still be taken over for settle-
ment by the executive. Once adjudicated, however, the American na-
tional has a judgment lien, a property interest. Interference at that stage
of the judicial process would give rise to a more serious infringement on
the independence of the court. 175 To introduce foreign policy considera-
tions in the post-judgment period, the executive must rely on authority
other than that of espousing international claims, i.e., the authority to
block execution of judgments through suggestions of immunity for for-
eign states' property. Like the power to settle claims, it is a deeply
rooted executive prerogative. In actual practice, aside from legal doc-
trine, the power to grant immunity is vital, for claims settlements com-
monly involve the unencumbered removal of property located in this
country.
II. Execution of Judgments Against Foreign Sovereigns
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 176 effected a major reform of
the law of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States. This legisla-
tion marked a substantial departure from the pre-1976 practice of coordi-
nated actions between the judicial and executive branches in the process
of determining foreign sovereign immunity.
The FSIA is commonly interpreted as making two changes in the prac-
tice of cooperation between the State Department and the courts when
granting immunity to foreign sovereigns in the United States. 77 First,
the FSIA is regarded as transferring the determination of foreign sover-
eign immunity into the domain of the judicial branch. Second, it is Con-
sidered as barring the exercise of executive authority over the sovereign
immunity determination.' 78
The conventional reading of the FSIA is overly broad and distorts the
statute's effect on foreign sovereign immunity law in the United States.
175. See American Int'l Group, 657 F.2d at 446 (regarding it as "advisable to limit the
effect of [the Iranian] agreements on the judicial process to the greatest extent possible consis-
tent with . . . international obligations .... .
176. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1982).
177. See, e.g., von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); Marks &
Grabow, supra note 16, at 68; Maier, The Proposed Sovereign Immunities Act: Its Effect on
Judicial Deference in Litigating the Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: Selected Problems of
Presenting Your Case in the Courts and the Executive Branch, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 41,
48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 PROCEEDINGS].
178. The State Department has recognized that the FSIA did not preclude all executive
participation; like other interested parties, the executive retains the right to participate as an
amicus curiae in court proceedings. See Letter from the Legal Adviser to the State Depart-
ment to the Attorney General (Nov. 10, 1976), reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 50,883 (1976) (dis-
cussing the State Department's future role in determining foreign sovereign immunity).
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The history of this body of law prior to 1976 and the legislative history of
the statute justify a narrower and more balanced interpretation of the
FSIA. To discern the actual scope of reforms introduced by the FSIA, it
is imperative first to clarify the pre-1976 state of foreign sovereign immu-
nity law in the United States.
A. The Evolution of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
in United States Law
1. The Distinction Between Immunity from Suit and Immunity
from Execution
Although Article III of the Constitution places suits against a foreign
state within the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts, 179 these
courts have traditionally relinquished their jurisdiction under the theory
of absolute foreign sovereign immunity. Introduced into American
courts by Chief Justice Marshall, the principle of absolute immunity de-
rives from his celebrated opinion in The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon. 180 Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, foreign
states and their instrumentalities were absolutely immune from the juris-
diction of American courts regardless of the nature of the activity that
resulted in a legal claim against them. The theory of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of American courts reached its
zenith in Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro,18 1 in which the Supreme
Court upheld the jurisdictional immunity of a merchant ship owned by
the government of Italy.
Since 1952, American courts and the State Department have adhered
to a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which was formally enun-
ciated as executive policy in the Tate letter.182 Unlike the theory of ab-
solute immunity, the restrictive theory allows foreign states and their
instrumentalities to raise the defense of foreign sovereign immunity only
in suits involving their public acts (fure imperii). Under the restrictive
theory, the defense of sovereign immunity does not defeat the jurisdiction
of American courts over commercial claims brought against a sovereign
for its non-public acts (Yure gestionis). 8 3
179. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. . .between a
State or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States Citizens or Subjects.").
180. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
181. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
182. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department, to Philip B.
Pelman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984
(1952).
183. In M'Faddon, Chief Justice Marshall alluded to the possible distinctions in applying
the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity to public and non-public acts of a sovereign: "It
may safely be affirmed that there is a manifest distinction between the private property of a
person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports the sovereign
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It is important to recognize that from its very inception the restrictive
theory applied only to the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states.
The property of foreign states continued to be absolutely immune both
from attachment to obtain jurisdiction and from execution to satisfy a
judgment. 184 The distinction between foreign sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction and foreign sovereign immunity from attachment and execu-
tion has been firmly embedded in American law at least since Dexter &
Carpenter v. Kungliga Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 18 5 in which the court refused to
authorize execution notwithstanding the defendant's waiver of jurisdic-
tional immunity.
The absolute immunity of foreign state property from attachment and
seizure hindered recovery by private claimants. Prior to the Tate Letter,
however, the issue of immunity from execution rarely surfaced, since
plaintiffs could not even obtain a judgment unless a foreign sovereign had
waived its immunity from jurisdiction. After 1952, when foreign sover-
eigns lost their prerogative of jurisdictional immunity in cases of jure
gestionis, their immunity from execution and attachment became a sub-
ject of controversy. American claimants could often secure in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign through the attachment
of its property. Yet due to the governing doctrine of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity from seizure of its property, in cases where jurisdic-
tion over a foreign sovereign was obtained by the attachment of its prop-
erty, courts were obligated to release the attached property and
consequently relinquish their jurisdiction over the case. 186
power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
145. Later, Marshall elaborated on this theory and stated in a clear fashion the principle that
one hundred and fifty years later would become the foundation of the modern American law of
sovereign immunity: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a
partner in any trading company, it devests [sic] itself, so far as concerns the transactions of
that company, of its sovereign character and takes that of a private citizen." Bank of United
States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
184. In a letter to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State indicated "that under inter-
national law property of a foreign government is immune from attachment and seizure, and
that the principle is not affected by a letter dated May 19, 1952, from the acting Legal Adviser
[Tate] to the Acting Attorney General [Perlman]." New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v.
Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
185. 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). This case was litigated under the rule of absolute jurisdic-
tional immunity, yet jurisdiction was retained due to the sovereign-defendant's waiver of its
immunity from jurisdiction. However, the court emphasized that the waiver of jurisdictional
immunity did not apply to the sovereign's immunity from execution of judgment: "[I]t is
hoped that the judgment of our courts will be respected and payment made by the Swedish
government." Id. at 710. This hope remained the only resort of American claimants suing
foreign sovereigns until the passage of the FSIA in 1976.
186. In New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Co., the court observed: "[The] Department of State
declares in unmistakable language that the property of a foreign government is immune from
attachment. Since jurisdiction here rests on the seizure under the writ of attachment, the
lifting of the attachment makes it unnecessary for the court to decide whether the Republic of
Korea would otherwise be entitled to immunity from suit." 132 F. Supp. at 686. It is impor-
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Subsequently, the State Department as well as the courts recognized
that in order to make the restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity
meaningful, absolute immunity from attachment, secured to obtained ju-
risdiction, should not be granted.18 7 However, even after plaintiffs were
allowed to secure jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign by the attachment
of its property, the property of the foreign state remained absolutely im-
mune from post-judgment execution.1 88
In sum, from the issuance of the Tate Letter in 1952 until the passage
of the FSIA in 1976, the United States law of foreign sovereign immunity
recognized a substantive distinction between immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from execution. The denial of jurisdictional immunity
and permission to attach property as a means of securing jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign had no bearing upon immunity from execution,
the latter being treated as an absolute privilege of a foreign sovereign.
2. The Role of the State Department
The Supreme Court recognized the leading role of the State Depart-
ment in the determination of foreign sovereign immunity in Compania
Espaffola De Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar. 189 Since that case
was decided, the courts have assumed an obligation of deference towards
the State Department's suggestions of immunity with respect to both ju-
risdiction and execution. The judiciary adopted this stance due to the
political ramifications of sovereign immunity determinations.1 90
tant to emphasize that in this case the State Department complied with the standards of the
Tate letter and did not raise the defense of foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction; it
only filed a suggestion of foreign sovereign immunity from seizure.
187. See Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); Note, Castro Government in American Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1613 (1962).
188. This position was clearly expressed in a letter from Legal Adviser Becker to Attorney
General Rogers which was written with respect to Weilamann. The letter stated:
The Department has always recognized the distinction between "immunity from jurisdic-
tion" and "immunity from execution." The Department has maintained the view that
under international law property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to sat-
isfy even a judgment obtained in an action against a foreign sovereign where there is no
immunity from suit.
The Department is of the further view that even when the attachment of the property of a
foreign sovereign is not prohibited for the purpose of jurisdiction, nevertheless the prop-
erty so attached and levied upon cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from
the suit because, in the Department's view, under international law the property of a
foreign sovereign is immune from execution even in cases where the foreign sovereign is
not immune from suit.
See Letter from the Legal Adviser [Becker] to the Department of State to the Attorney Gen-
eral [Rogers] (Mar. 9, 1959), reprinted in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
709, 711 (1968).
189. 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
190. In Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1942), the Court observed:
The Department has allowed the claim of immunity and caused its action to be certified to
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Publication of the Tate Letter did not alter the State Department's
dominant role in the process of sovereign immunity determinations. Judi-
cial opinions of the post-1952 period displayed the utmost deference to
suggestions of immunity transmitted by the State Department: courts
ruled on issues of foreign sovereign immunity as prescribed by the State
Department. 191
Since the law of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States after
1952 was still controlled by the theory of absolute immunity from execu-
tion, a foreign state usually solicited the State Department's assistance
only in the form of a suggestion of immunity from jurisdiction. 192
Although the State Department attempted to make its decisions in con-
formity with the principles it had enunciated in the Tate Letter, on occa-
sion it deviated from them. 193 Courts followed the State Department's
suggestions of immunity regardless of their consistency with Tate letter
standards. 194
the District Court through the appropriate channels. The certification and the request
that the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive deter-
mination by the political arm of the government that the continued retention of the vessel
interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the submission of the
certification to the District Court, it became the court's duty, in conformity to established
principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no further in the cause.
Id. at 588. See also Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
191. See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court held that
"[w]hen the executive branch has determined that the interests of the nation are best served by
granting a foreign sovereign immunity from suit in our courts, there are compelling reasons to
defer to that judgment without question."
192. In any case involving the issue of foreign sovereign immunity, a sovereign defendant
could either raise this issue in court or approach the State Department and solicit its interven-
tion. In the latter case, the State Department would request the pleadings of the parties and,
having made its decision, would send its suggestion to the office of the Attorney General which
would present it to the court. In the late 1960's, the State Department began to hold its own
hearings on assertions of foreign sovereign immunity before sending suggestions of immunity
to the court. For a critique of these proceedings, see Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process in the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 22 Bus. LAW. 3, 21 (1965); Cardozo, Sovereign
Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 608 (1954); Timberg,
Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in International Eco-
nomic Regulation, 17 AD. L. Rav. 159 (1965).
193. The State Department has recognized that political considerations have influenced its
determinations on only four occasions. In these four cases, the courts followed the State De-
partment suggestions of immunity. See Sandler, Vagts & Ristau, Sovereign Immunity Deci-
sions of the Department of State 1952-1977, 1977 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 1021. Critics of
the State Department's decision-making process have also singled out four cases as decided on
a political rather than a legal basis; however, they cite different cases. See Note, Statutory
Reform in Claims Against Foreign States, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 400 (1971).
In those cases where the Department of State failed for any reason to make a suggestion of
immunity, courts usually applied Tate Letter standards on their own initiative. See, e.g., Vic-
tory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
357-62 (2d Cir. 1964).
194. In Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the court stated:
The potential harm or embarrassment resulting to our government from a judicial finding
of jurisdiction, in the face of an Executive recommendation to the contrary, may be just as
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The Department of State infrequently filed suggestions of immunity
from execution. The rarity of these cases can readily be explained.
Before the State Department would fie a suggestion of immunity from
execution, three conditions normally had to be satisfied: (1) the sover-
eign defendant had to be denied jurisdictional immunity; (2) it had to
waive its immunity from execution; and (3) it had to convince the State
Department to interfere in court proceedings with a suggestion of immu-
nity from execution, despite the prior waiver of this immunity by the
foreign sovereign. In cases where these conditions were satisfied, courts
construed State Department suggestions of immunity as superseding
prior waivers of immunity by foreign sovereigns.195 Thus, a foreign sov-
ereign could avoid execution against its property notwithstanding a de-
nial of jurisdictional immunity or even its prior waiver of immunity from
execution.
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 196 illustrates judicial deference to State
Department suggestions of immunity from execution. In that case, the
court blocked the seizure of a Cuban ship, sought by plaintiffs to satisfy a
prior judgment against Cuba. 197 Execution on the judgment was denied
despite the foreign sovereign's waiver of immunity from execution with
respect to one of the claimants. 198 The court heeded the State Depart-
ment's suggestion of immunity, even though it was based on purely polit-
ical considerations. 199 This judicial practice of adhering completely to
severe where the foreign sovereign had initially contracted to waive its claim of sovereign
immunity as where it had not done so. Though we sympathize with appellant because of
the difficult position in which such a holding places it, we have no alternative but to
accept the recommendation of the State Department.
195. See Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964). In that case, the court observed, with respect to foreign sovereign
immunity from both jurisdiction and execution, that although "a foreign power may have
waived its immunity in a pending action by the entry of a general appearance, the overriding
political considerations would require recognition of the immunity when the State Department
suggests its allowance is in the national interest .. " Id. at 625.
196. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), afid, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
197. Id. at 712; see also Chemical Natural Resources v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 184, 215
A.2d 864, 888 (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966).
198. 197 F. Supp. at 723; 295 F.2d at 26.
199. A note signed by Secretary of State Rusk and Attorney General Kennedy stated,
"[t]his is to inform you that it has been determined that the release of this vessel would avoid
further disturbances to our international relations in the premises. . . ." 197 F. Supp. at 714.
The trial court held that "the clear weight of authority in this country, as well as that in
England and continental Europe is against all seizures, even though a valid judgment has been
entered." Id. at 722 (citing Dexter & Carpenter, 43 F.2d at 708). The court of appeals con-
cluded that the "refusal of the State Department in these circumstances to enforce Cuba's
earlier waiver over its present assertion of immunity is within the Department's authority, and
constitutes no violation of the libellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment." 295 F.2d at 26.
At a press conference held during the incident, Secretary of State Rusk reiterated the State
Department's authority to immunize foreign sovereign property:
When Cuban airplanes arrive in the United States and when an effort is made by claim-
ants in the U.S. to have such airplanes attached and sold, such airplanes, like any other
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the State Department's suggestions of immunity continued until the pas-
sage of the FSIA in 1976.2 0
As revealed by the preceding historical analysis, before enactment of
the FSIA, the United States practice of foreign sovereign immunity was
governed by the following principles:
1. The restrictive theory applied to jurisdictional immunity of foreign
sovereigns. The State Department possessed the power to raise the sov-
ereign immunity defense in its suggestion to a court. This power was
available even in cases involving a foreign sovereign's waiver of jurisdic-
tional immunity as well as those involving a foreign sovereign's commer-
cial activity.20 1 Courts treated all State Department suggestions of
immunity as binding.
2. The absolute theory applied to foreign sovereign immunity from
execution. The State Department's suggestions of immunity superseded
the foreign sovereign's prior waiver of immunity from execution.
In sum, executive power to make binding suggestions of foreign sover-
eign immunity to courts did not depend on the type of foreign sovereign
immunity involved: either from jurisdiction or from execution. Nor did
executive power depend on the applicable theory of foreign sovereign im-
munity, whether absolute or restrictive. Established practice and settled
law were grounded in the doctrine of "comity" between these two
property owned by Cuban government can be released from attachment for purposes of
execution to satisfy a judgment. And if there are any lawyers here, may I repeat that
phrase-property owned by the Cuban government can be released from attachment for
purposes of execution to satisfy a judgment if a timely plea of sovereign immunity is
interposed.
DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1961, at 275-78. Such cases as Rich could arise only on rare occasions.
In Rich, the State Department was anxious to intervene in court proceedings with a suggestion
of immunity from execution due to the necessity of retrieving from Cuba an American airplane
hijacked to the island. See generally A. CHAYES, T. ERLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNA-
nONAL LEGAL PROCESS 87 (1968) (describing the diplomatic background of the case). Even
the most celebrated legal opinion criticizing the pre-1976 practice ofjudicial deference to exec-
utive suggestions of immunity endorsed the result reached in Rich. See Chemical Natural
Resources, 420 Pa. at 184, 215 A.2d at 888 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
200. On April 2, 1974, a panel of three attorneys in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the
Department of State, working on a case involving foreign sovereign immunity, gave a sum-
mary of the law then in effect:
[In] a case of immunity from execution, rather than immunity from suit, the distinction
drawn by the Tate Letter between public and private transactions does not apply, in view
of the Department's existing policy that property of a sovereign is immune from attach-
ment for execution even in cases where there is no immunity from suit. . . .Moreover,
courts have recently held that even explicit waivers [of immunity from execution] do not
withstand a suggestion of immunity by the Department.
Sandier, Vagts & Ristau, supra note 193, at 267.
201. It is important to realize that the commercial activity exception to the rule of general
foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction can be viewed as a form of an implicit waiver
which is presumed from the nature of the activity involved, as opposed to an explicit contrac-
tual waiver. See Griffin, Execution Against the Foreign Sovereign's Property: The Current
Scene, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 105, 109-12 (1961).
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branches of the federal government and reflected the concern of the judi-
ciary that the conduct of the country's foreign relations not be embar-
rassed or hindered by its own independence. 202
B. A New Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Congress passed the FSIA to change the pre-existing law of foreign
sovereign immunity. It envisioned four primary purposes to be achieved
by the new statute:203
1. To codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity;
2. To transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the ex-
ecutive to the judicial branch;
3. To provide a statutory procedure for service of process upon for-
eign sovereigns; and
4. To replace a foreign sovereign's absolute immunity from execution
with restrictive immunity.204
Interpreting the FSIA, legal scholars, practitioners, and courts have
construed it to impose a total ban on "the President's authority to make
binding determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded foreign
states. °20 5 In its assessment of the State Department's future role, this
reading of the FSIA fails to make the critical distinction between immu-
nity from suit in United States courts and immunity from execution after
the courts have exercised jurisdiction and rendered a judgment. The
FSIA eliminated the State Department's power to make binding sugges-
tions of jurisdictional immunity. However, the iight of the executive
branch to file with courts suggestions of foreign soverieign immunity from
execution, previously acknowledged by courts an exercised by the State
Department, remained intact. A careful analysis of the text of the FSIA,
its legislative history, and other documents relating to its evolution
202. Some courts have viewed this law as growing out of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Thus, the court in Rich stated:
We conclude that the certificate and grant of immunity issued by the Department of State
should be accepted by the court without further inquiry. We think that the doctrine of
the separation of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume that all pertinent
considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in reaching his
conclusion.
295 F.2d at 26 (citations omitted). See also Spacil v. Crow, 489 F.2d at 619 (principle of
separation of powers requires judicial deference to executive determinations of immunity). But
see Maier, supra note 177, at 49.
203. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP.].
204. Id. at 6606.
205. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685; See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 31, at 100 (testi-
mony of Thomas Luce); von Mehren, supra note 177, at 65; Carl, supra note 177, at 1063.
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demonstrate that Congress proscribed State Department interference
only in the domain of jurisdictional immunity. The FSIA did not alter
the executive power to make suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity
from execution. 20 6
1. The Intent of the FSIA
None of the FSIA's provisions expressly limit executive power to make
binding suggestions of immunity to the courts, as exercised before 1976.
Therefore, to discern the effect of the FSIA on the pre-existing law of
foreign sovereign immunity, it is important to look separately at each
purpose of the statute.
The first purpose of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, which had originally been an-
nounced as national policy in the Tate letter.207 The FSIA leaves no
doubt that the restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity had become
the law of the United States, applicable in all sovereign immunity pro-
ceedings.20 8 Codification of the restrictive theory put Congress's stamp
on a jurisdictional principle which earlier had been a unilateral and non-
statutory executive policy. This action also signalled Congress's goal of
preventing future deviations from Tate Letter standards of jurisdictional
immunity, which had resulted in the past from the State Department's
receptiveness to political pressures.
This congressional objective of "insulating" the procedure for deter-
mining foreign sovereign immunity from political pressures was mani-
fested in the second purpose of the FSIA: to "transfer the determination
of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judiciary,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determina-
tions." 2°9 Since passage of the FSIA, the corresponding statutory provi-
sion has been interpreted as a denial of the State Department's right to
make any foreign sovereign immunity suggestions to the courts. No dis-
tinction has been made between suggestions of immunity from jurisdic-
tion and suggestions of immunity from execution.
Some scholars discussing the FSIA have found support for this inter-
pretation of the statute's effect on executive powers in the broad state-
206. It appears that Congress was not informed about the existing differences between
State Department suggestions of immunity from jurisdiction and from execution. This issue
was never presented to Congress and was never discussed in the context of the future State
Department role in sovereign immunity proceedings. Interview with William Shattuck, Coun-
sel of the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Judici-
ary Comm., in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 15, 1985) (notes on file with the Yale Journal of
International Law).
207. H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6605.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).




ment of congressional purpose.210 Other commentators 211 have grounded
this reading on the intent of the FSIA's sponsors, as expressed in letters
accompanying the submission of the draft legislation to Congress. 212
Further, a party to litigation involving the FSIA has tried to draw the
purposes of the statute out of a public statement made by President Ford
after passage of the bill, to the effect that American courts had now
opened their doors much wider to disputes against foreign states.213
Although the ambiguous language of the statute and other legislative
documents can be interpreted as precluding executive interference in all
sovereign immunity proceedings, including those addressing the issue of
execution, in the final analysis, this view is not warranted. Careful expo-
sition of the FSIA's second objective against the background of its legis-
lative history demonstrates that Congress acted only with respect to State
Department control over jurisdictional immunity and did not extinguish
executive power to make suggestions of immunity from execution.
Congress's second purpose was actually to ensure consistent imple-
mentation of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction.214 Congress not only remained silent with respect to immu-
210. See, eg., Carl, supra note 177, at 1063.
211. Comment, Proposed Draft Legislation on the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Govern-
ments: An Attempt to Revest the Courts with a Judicial Function, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 302, 326
(1974).
212. Letter from the Department of State and the Department of Justice to the President
of the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 118 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Letter of
Jan. 22, 1973]. The letter stated:
The effect of the draft bill would be to accomplish [inter alia]: [t]he task of determining
whether a foreign state is entitled to immunity would be transferred wholly to the courts,
and the Department of State would no longer express itself on requests for immunity
directed to it by the courts or by-the foreign state.
An analogous statement was made in the Letter from the Department of State and Depart-
ment of Justice to the President of the Senate (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 88 (1975).
213. Counsel for Electronic Data Systems Corporation, involved in litigation against Iran,
asserted that the following statement of President Ford raised expectations of recovery against
Iran:
This legislation will enable American citizens and foreign governments alike to ascertain
when a foreign state can be sued in our courts. In this modem world where private citi-
zens increasingly come into contact with foreign government activities it is important to
know when the courts are available to redress legal grievances. This statute will make it
easier for our citizens and foreign governments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary
legal disputes.
See 1981 Hearings, supra note 31, at 100. Ironically, President Ford's statement, especially as
the remark of a lawyer, supports the point of view of the present Article. President Ford no
doubt saw the statute as addressing only the problem of jurisdiction. At any rate, he made no
allusions to its possible effect on executive authority over foreign sovereign immunity from
execution.
214. After stating the first congressional purpose, the legislative analysis continued: "The
bill will insure that the restrictive principle is applied in litigation before U.S. courts. Although
the State Department espouses the restrictive principle of immunity the foreign state may at-
tempt to bring diplomatic influence to bear upon the State Department." H.R. RnP., supra
note 203, at 6606. Here, as well as in other instances, Congress did not explicitly specify the
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nity from execution, but expressly confirmed that as a result of achieving
the principal purpose of the FSIA, "the Department of State will be freed
from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their immunity
from suit and from any adverse consequences resulting from an unwill-
ingness of the Department to support that immunity. '215
It is evident from the legislative history that Congress was primarily
concerned with the quasi-judicial nature of the proceedings conducted by
the State Department after a foreign.state's request for recognition of
immunity from jurisdiction.216 A general consensus existed that the
State Department was neither suited to guarantee due process in these
proceedings nor capable of withstanding pressures emanating from for-
eign states.217 The abolition of State Department proceedings should be
seen as an attempt to cure procedural defects in the process of making
immunity decisions.218 The transfer of authority to courts represents the
last step of a trend toward upgrading the legality of the adjudication of
sovereign immunity claims.219
However, entrusting adjudication of sovereign immunity claims to the
judiciary addresses only the issue of foreign sovereigns' jurisdictional im-
munity and has no apparent bearing upon the question of execution. No
proceedings on the issue of execution had been held in the State Depart-
ment prior to the passage of the FSIA because of the absolute immunity
from execution of the property of foreign states. In addition, quasi-judi-
cial State Department hearings are not necessary before entering sugges-
immunity to which it refers. It is clear, however, that Congress spoke only about foreign sover-
eign immunity from jurisdiction, which prior to the passage of the FSIA was governed by the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and not about the immunity from execution, which
was absolutely granted to foreign sovereigns.
215. Id. at 6606 (emphasis added).
216. The State Department's procedural difficulties in complying with Tate Letter princi-
ples appeared to have been the only concern expressly brought to the attention of Congress as
a justification for the transfer of the sovereign immunity decision-making process to the courts.
See Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hear-
ings]. See also H.R. RiEP., supra note 203, at 6607.
217. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 216, at 34 (statement of Monroe Leigh). See also
Leigh, Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the "Imias, " 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 280 (1974) (criticiz-
ing State Department immunity determinations).
218. See supra note 192.
219. One commentator, who called for the expansion of procedural safeguards in State
Department administrative hearings, nonetheless warned that "accountability should not be
secured by placing the executive branch under restraints not contemplated by the Federal
Constitution and subordinating it to the legislative branch. Greater administrative accountabil-
ity need not involve any infringement upon the constitutional doctrine of separation of pow-
ers." See Timberg, supra note 192, at 169. The constitutional validity of the FSIA remains an
unresolved question. Nonetheless, the suggested interpretation of the statute will mitigate
many constitutional problems raised by the restriction placed on the executive's foreign policy




tions of immunity from execution, since at that stage suggestions may be
transmitted on strictly political grounds.220 Therefore Congress, dis-
pleased with the procedure of determining a foreign sovereign's jurisdic-
tional immunity, cured only the widely conceded problem of State
Department intervention in litigation through its suggestions of immu-
nity from suit. This position is also supported in a letter expressing the
intent of the sponsors of the draft legislation that was attached to the bill
when it was sent to the Senate for consideration:
[T]he courts normally defer to the views of the Department of State, which
puts the Department in the difficult position of effectively determining
whether the plaintiff will have his day in court. . . . [I]t was not satisfac-
tory that a department acting through administrative procedures, should in
the generality of cases determine whether the plaintiff will or will not be
permitted to pursue his cause of action.221
Legislative history is consistent with the express language of section
1602 of the FSIA which refers only to the courts' exclusive authority
over the "determination of the claims of foreign states to the immunity
from jurisdiction.' 222 Although courts are also authorized to adjudicate
claims of foreign sovereign immunity from execution, 223 as they usually
did before 1976, there is no indication anywhere in the statute or other
legislative materials that the State Department had lost the authority to
block execution of judgments against foreign sovereigns. Though the ac-
quisition of executive power through congressional acquiescence has
been criticized, it is even more problematic to read into congressional
silence a denial of well-established executive authority, especially in an
area integral to the discharge of the executive's foreign policy
responsibilities. 224
The third purpose of the FSIA-establishment of new rules for service
of process-has no direct bearing on the changes in relations between the
judicial and the executive branches. However, the continuity of the State
Department's role in the process of adjudication of claims against foreign
sovereigns is underscored even in sections which provide for service of
process through diplomatic channels. 225
Lastly, the extension of the restrictive theory to foreign sovereign im-
220. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
221. Letter of Jan. 22, 1973, supra note 212, at 120 (emphasis added).
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).
223. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter." Id.
224. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
225. Thus § 1608(a)(4) of the FSIA, authorizing service of process through the State De-
partment, indicates the dependence of the judicial branch on assistance from the State Depart-
ment even in bringing foreign sovereigns into U.S. courts. The special position of the State
Department is further bolstered by the fact that the transmission of the notice of suit through
339
Yale Journal of International Law
munity from execution-the fourth congressional purpose in the FSIA-
by no means alters the pre-existing balance in the relations between the
courts and the State Department in favor of the former.226 Sections 1609
and 1610 (a) & (b) of the FSIA codified the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity from execution by allowing post-judgment attachment of
some types of foreign sovereign property. As indicated in the House re-
port explaining the statute's objectives, these sections effected a move
from absolute immunity from execution to a regime "conforming more
closely" with the restrictive immunity of foreign states from jurisdic-
tion.2 27 There is no sign anywhere in the legislative materials that these
provisions were intended to have any impact on executive powers.228 The
practical effect of sections 1609 and 1610 (a) & (b) can be compared to
the operation of the restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity from
1952 to 1976. During that period, despite the courts' and the State De-
partment's adherence to Tate Letter standards, the State Department
continued to file binding suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction if political necessity so demanded. 229 In effect, the FSIA
changed the law of foreign sovereign immunity from execution in the
same way as the Tate letter had changed the law of foreign sovereign
immunity from jurisdiction: the FSIA introduced the restrictive theory
into the area of immunity from execution. It did not eradicate executive
authority to make suggestions of immunity from execution to courts.
Thus congressional documents amply demonstrate that only the State
Department's power over the determination of foreign sovereign immu-
nity from jurisdiction was removed by the FSIA. Even if the wording of
some legislative materials can be interpreted as withholding executive au-
thority in the area of sovereign immunity from execution, this interpreta-
tion clearly misrepresents congressional intent. An overview of the
its network is deemed valid even without a formal acceptance of the message by a foreign
sovereign.
226. The legislative history, if anything, points in the opposite direction, indicating that
Congress was dissatisfied chiefly with foreign sovereign immunity from execution "in ordinary
litigation, when commercial assets are available for the satisfaction of the judgment." H.R.
REP., supra note 203, at 6610. By implication, Congress recognized that non-judicial assist-
ance-State Department interference-would be required to satisfy a judgment in an ex-
traordinary case with no adequate commercial property within the country.
227. H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6626.
228. Although on its face § 1610 might be read as establishing strict principles of execu-
tion of judgments not to be circumvented by any executive policy, its language is similar to
§ 1605 which defined exceptions to jurisdictional immunity of foreign states (restrictive theory
of jurisdictional immunity), but is not purported to have any bearing upon executive authority.
Accordingly, § 1610 must be interpreted only as introducing a restrictive theory of execution.
All changes in the allocation of responsibilities between the State Department and the courts
were made in § 1602, which did not touch the executive's right to make suggestions of foreign
sovereign immunity from execution. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.




FSIA's evolution and of prevailing standards of international law con-
firms this conclusion.
2. The History of the FSIA
The initial draft of the legislation which would eventually embody the
principles of foreign sovereign immunity law in the United States was
proposed in 1969.230 This proposal, as well as the FSIA, codified the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. Un-
like the FSIA, however, the original draft provided for absolute immu-
nity of foreign sovereign property from execution of adverse judgments
in American courts.231 The proposal's drafters adopted this approach not
only because they believed that it adequately reflected international prac-
tice, but also because they considered that only a rule of absolute immu-
nity from execution would promote independent judicial determinations
of foreign sovereign immunity. In the opinion of the drafters of the 1969
version, a liberal rule permitting enforcement of judgments against for-
eign sovereign property was fraught with unforseeable foreign policy
risks which would inevitably require State Department participation in
the decision-making process. Thus, the original drafters considered the
adoption of absolute immunity from execution as the only means for
achieving the major objective of their proposal-total eradication of
quasi-judicial proceedings conducted in the State Department for the
purpose of determining foreign sovereign immunity. At the same time,
the sponsors of the Act conceded that the introduction of the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity from execution remained a viable
alternative. In that event, however, they insisted that adoption of restric-
tive immunity would require retention of executive control over the
determination of immunity from execution. 232 Thus, diplomatic consid-
erations were central at the outset of the reform of rules of sovereign
immunity from execution. Drafters of a revised version of the legislation
in 1973 opted to introduce a restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity from execution which afforded more meaningful protection to
230. Note, Statutory Reform in Claims Against Foreign States: The Belman-Lowenfeld Pro-
posal, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 401 (1972). Both Belman and Lowenfeld served as
Assistant Legal Advisers to the State Department. Lowenfeld was appointed to oversee the
preparation of the State Department's review of foreign sovereign immunity law.
231. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 937 (1969) (provision 2(d)(1) of the proposed Act); Belman, New
Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 182, 186 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 PROCEEDINGS]. The rule of absolute immunity from execution was
also advocated in the first memorandum proposing codification of the new law of foreign sov-
ereign immunity. This memorandum was submitted to the Legal Adviser to the State Depart-
ment in the fall of 1966. See A. CHAYEs, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 199, at
150-53.
232. Lowenfeld, supra note 231, at 928, 930.
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American claimants. 233 Although the drafters of the 1969 proposal were
clearly concerned about the compatibility of the chosen theory of immu-
nity from execution with the role of the State Department in the determi-
nation of this immunity, in 1973 this correlation was neglected. The
need to revive expressly the State Department's role in response to the
shift toward a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity from execution
was overlooked.
Testimony at the 1973 hearings regarding the legislation suggests that
in submitting the new bill for congressional deliberations, the State De-
partment intended to retain some control over the sovereign immunity
determination process. The extent of this control, however, was never
spelled out.2 34 Nonetheless, the text of the 1973 bill, by referring to the
principles of the Tate letter, implies that Congress-in concert with the
State Department-addressed only the issue of executive suggestions of
foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, and not the issue of sover-
eign immunity from execution. 235
By 1976, all references to the survival of the State Department's role in
the foreign sovereign immunity determination process-with respect
either to jurisdiction or to execution-vanished from congressional hear-
ings. 236 Certainly, the absence of any discussions regarding the State De-
partment's authority to make suggestions of immunity from execution
cannot be viewed as an indication of congressional intent to deprive the
233. See Note, supra note 230, at 406.
234. The Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department stated that "of course [the State
Department's] ability to make suggestions with respect to other questions would remain
unimpaired." 1973 Hearings, supra note 144, at 15 (statement of Charles Brower). It appears
from the context of the testimony that Brower referred to suggestions with respect to questions
other than those "of law and fact," namely those of a political nature.
235. Thus, in the legislative analysis of § 1602 of the 1973 bill, Congress states that "deci-
sions concerning claims of foreign states to immunity are best made by the judiciary on the
basis of the statutory regime which incorporates the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity."
S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 118, 132 (emphasis added). Because Con-
gress explicitly equated "restrictive theory" with the Tate Letter principles, which do not ap-
ply to foreign sovereign immunity from execution, Congress was clearly speaking only about
foreign sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. The same argument with respect to the 1976
bill is less forceful, since the words "restrictive theory" were replaced by the words "interna-
tional law." The latter, in contrast with the Tate Letter, has no uniformly accepted standard.
This discrepancy is certainly not vital to the argument here, since the 1976 bill, according to
Congress, did not deviate in substance from the 1973 version. See H.R. REP., supra note 203,
at 6608.
236. It is interesting to note that the currently accepted interpretation of the FSIA repre-
sents primarily the views of Monroe Leigh as he expressed them during the 1969 discussion of
the subject. See Leigh, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 231, at 187. Leigh became the Legal Adviser to the State Department in
1975, and his testimony was the cornerstone of the 1976 congressional hearings. Yet, even
Leigh in his testimony talked only about the enforcement of the restrictive theory of jurisdic-
tional immunity and did not allude to the possible effects of the bill on the State Department's





executive branch of this power. It remains somewhat mysterious that
such a critical issue as the State Department's control over foreign sover-
eign immunity from execution was never raised at the hearings; it is even
more mysterious that the interpretation of the FSIA that deprives the
State Department of this long-established authority was readily
accepted.237
A possible explanation for the lack of concern on the part of State
Department officials testifying at the 1976 hearings can be found in the
"safety valve" built into §§ 1604 and 1609 of the draft legislation. 23
These sections made all provisions of the bill subject to "existing and
future international agreements," thus providing the State Department
with a viable solution to any diplomatic conflict in the form of an ad hoc
international (executive) agreement.239 The State Department's possible
reliance on this language becomes ironic, since after the hearings refer-
ence to "future" international agreements was deleted.240 As a result of
this amendment, the State Department was apparently deprived of an
option it had advocated at the 1976 hearings.241 Thus, in addition to
misconstruing congressional intent, the present interpretation of the
FSIA, which denies the State Department any leverage in foreign sover-
eign immunity cases, does not accurately reflect the views of the execu-
tive branch-the statute's main sponsor.242
Moreover, the current interpretation of the FSIA does not give full
237. See supra note 177. It has been suggested that the State Department's support for the
FSIA was "intended merely as a smokescreen to hide the nature of the Executive's real deci-
sion-making power in this area from foreign sovereigns in view of the diplomatic pressures that
flow naturally from the general international knowledge that the United States Executive has
such power." Note, supra note 39, at 126 n. 124. This theory is in complete agreement with
the argument of this Article, which attempts to decipher the powers transferred to the courts
and those reserved to the executive. Unfortunately, the State Department's support of the
FSIA may be seen as an expression of a shortsighted unwillingness to get involved in cumber-
some and politically controversial sovereign immunity decisions. In addition, it is conceivable
that the drafters of the bill in Congress did not consult adequately with representatives of the
State Department. If so, the absence of continuous communications with Congress may ac-
count for the State Department's failure to raise many pertinent issues during the hearings.
238. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 216, at 6, 17 (draft of 1976 version of FSIA).
239. The hearings proceeded under the assumption that the statute would include refer-
ence to "future" agreements. Id. at 32, 52.
240. H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6610. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (1982).
241. This is a questionable result for two reasons. First, it runs counter to the wishes of
the State Department, which had supported the retention of an authority to enter formal trea-
ties regarding sovereign immunity. 1976 Hearings, supra note 216, at 52 (testimony of Monroe
Leigh). Second, and more strangely, it deprives the Senate of a power granted to it in the
Constitution.
242. An accurate interpretation of the State Department's intent is important for the con-
stitutional validity of the FSIA. See, eg., von Mehren, supra note 177, at 66. A complete
denial of executive power in the FSIA over the objection of the executive branch would cause a
serious conflict over separation of powers. The preservation of State Department authority
over execution, however, as suggested in this Article, deflects possible constitutional attacks on
the statute.
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effect to the express congressional objective of bringing the United
States's foreign sovereign immunity practice into line with that of "virtu-
ally every other country." 243 The restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity from execution is not, in itself, a uniformly accepted norm of
international practice.244 Even after the introduction of a restrictive the-
ory of immunity from execution in the United States, the State Depart-
ment invoked the principle of absolute immunity when faced with
enforcement of judgments against American property abroad.245 Fur-
thermore, the exclusion of the State Department from sovereign immu-
nity determination conflicts with the practice in "courts of Europe
[which] essentially follow the instructions of their [respective] executive
branches on matters of sovereign immunity. '246 A statute requiring judi-
cial enforcement of judgments against foreign sovereigns without any al-
lowance for participation by political branches of the government would
make the United States law of foreign sovereign immunity an imprudent
exception from general international practice.247
243. H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6606.
244. Congress acknowledged that "the enforcement of judgments against foreign state
property remains a somewhat controversial subject in international law." Id. at 6626. See also
1976Hearings, supra note 216, at 33 (testimony of Monroe Leigh) ("[I]n one respect we would
be going somewhat further than other countries in that we would be providing for execution
after judgment in favor of American litigants").
245. Two years before the passage of the FSIA, the State Department continued to espouse
the principle of absolute immunity from execution as a valid norm of international law. For
example, in protesting the seizure of American property pursuant to an Iraqi court judgment,
the State Department asserted: "The clear weight of authority. . . is against all seizures, even
though a valid judgment has been entered. . .[i]t is but recognizing the general international
understanding, recognized by civilized nations, that a sovereign's person and property ought to
be held free from seizure or molestation .. " DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 274 (1974) (quoting
Department of State note to Iraqi interest section of Embassy of India, Jan. 14, 1974). It is
even more ironic that this statement is quoted from Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagss-
tyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1930), a case described as outdated in the House Report
explaining the FSIA provisions on foreign sovereign immunity from execution. H.R. REP.,
supra note 203, at 6626.
246. 1969 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 231, at 202 (statement of Professor B. Yanakakis).
247. The European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol, May, 1982,
Europ. T.S. No. 74, which had a substantial impact on the FSIA, makes execution of judg-
ments against foreign states optional. Id. art. 23. Moreover, a state is not obliged to give effect
to such a judgment in any case where it would be manifestly contrary to public policy in that
state. Id. art. 20. See generally Comment, Sovereign Immunity From Judicial Enforcement:
The Impact of the European Convention of State Immunity, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 130
(1973).
Some European countries disallow execution of any judgment against a foreign sovereign
without approval of the executive branch. During the discussion of the 1969 Act it was noted
that executive suggestions of immunity did not exist in civil law countries. See 1969 PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 231, at 189 (statement of Bruno Ristau). Ristau offered as an example of
American parochialism attempts to approach government officials in Italy, Holland, and
Greece when the United States had been brought to court in these countries. Ironically, in all
these countries the executive branch has the authority to intervene in sovereign immunity
proceedings. See Condorelli & Sbolci, Measures of Execution Against the Property of Foreign
States: The Law and Practice in Italy, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 68 (1979) (Italy); Voskuil, The
International Law of State Immunity as Reflected in the Dutch Civil Law of Execution, 10
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An objection may be raised to the apparent inconsistency in the sig-
gested legal order between complete judicial power over subject-matter-
jurisdiction-vested in the courts by Congress-and limited control over
the enforcement of judgments rendered in the exercise of this power.
The proposed interpretation of the FSIA, although not as expansive as
the common one which completely separates the responsibilities of the
two branches, still represents a considerable improvement over the ear-
lier practice which provided for an overlap of executive and judicial au-
thority on two levels: jurisdiction and execution. Moreover, the suggested
reading of the FSIA parallels other areas of law integrally linked to for-
eign policy in which the executive branch, even after a judicial decision,
has a veto power over the execution ofjudgments. The extradition law of
the United States, for instance, expressly places the ultimate decision-
making authority within the exclusive purview of the Secretary of State,
regardless of initial judicial rulings.248
3. Pragmatic Considerations Supporting the Suggested Reading
of the FSIA
The suggested approach to the FSIA has the salutary effect of promot-
ing diplomatic effectiveness without hurting potential American claim-
ants. It achieves a necessary compromise between the total exclusion of
the executive branch from sovereign immunity determinations and the
executive's discretionary intervention in all foreign sovereign immunity
decisions.249
Forceful execution of judgments against a foreign state is widely recog-
nized as a more serious encroachment upon its sovereignty than submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of another nation's courts.250 In addition, the
NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 288 (1979) (Holland); Decision of the Athens Court of Appeals, No.
1690 of 1949, 3 REv. HILLENIQUE DE DRorr INT'L 331 (1950), cited in Crawford, Execution
of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 820, 834 (1981) (Greece).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). See also Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.
1980) (judicial decision refusing extradition of a U.S. citizen to Mexico subject to Executive
review).
249. Michael Cardozo appears to be the most consistent and adamant advocate of the
necessity for the State Department's right to intervene in all sovereign immunity proceedings.
See 1976 Hearings, supra note 216, at 61-67; Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department
Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963).
In agreement with the views of Cardozo, it has been suggested that the FSIA should be supple-
mented with a provision analogous to the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1962, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370 (e) (2) (1976). See Carl, supra note 177, at 1067; Note, supra
note 230, at 430. This amendment, if passed, would authorize executive intervention also on
the issue of jurisdiction, and therefore would effectively reintroduce problems from the pre-
1976 era.
250. See, e.g., Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity. Recent Developments, in II
RECUEIL DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 113, 219-20 (1980) ("[W]hatever may be the theoretical relationship between jurisdic-
tional immunity and immunity from execution, the sensitivities of foreign States are likely to
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international community generally agrees that enforcement of judicial
decrees is not only a more offensive measure which may result in unpre-
dictable retaliatory actions, but can also be a less efficient and less pro-
ductive path for the recovery of a judgment. 251
The correlation between attachments of foreign sovereign property
and their consequences for foreign policy is also recognized in the legisla-
tive history of the FSIA:252 "The elimination of attachment as a vehicle
for commencing a lawsuit will ease the conduct of foreign relations by
the United States and help eliminate the necessity for determinations of
claims of sovereign immunity by the State Department. ' 253 Taken to its
logical conclusion, this statement undermines the conventional interpre-
tation of the FSIA. It is unlikely that Congress recognized the foreign
policy problems stemming from pre-judgment attachments only to per-
mit the very same problems to emerge in the area of execution. Intro-
duction of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity from execution,
which provides for enforcement of judgments by attaching foreign sover-
eign property, injects a new irritant into the conduct of foreign affairs
and, therefore, should be accompanied at least by the retention of the
State Department's participation in determining foreign sovereign immu-
nity from execution.
This conclusion is most forcefully supported by Professor H. Lauter-
pacht, who as early as 1951, advocated complete abolition of foreign sov-
ereign prerogatives with respect to execution of valid judgments. 254
However, even such an extreme opponent of immunity from execution as
Professor Lauterpacht concluded:
[C]ontingencies are conceivable in which seizure of the property or of the
assets of the foreign state might cause friction and raise issues likely to dis-
turb in a serious way the friendly relations with the state concerned. Ac-
cordingly, if immunity from execution is abolished in principle, it may be
be aroused if, following upon the denial of a claim to jurisdictional immunity, the courts of the
State of the forum authorise the levying of forced execution against the property of the defend-
ant State.").
251. "Apparently it has been felt experience in the past that it is better for the state against
which judgment is rendered to be led by public opinion, the obligations of good faith or diplo-
matic pressure to carry out the award than to have its property seized in execution by the
officials of another government." Griffin, supra note 201, at 113. This view is also supported
by the fact that before passage of the FSIA most of the judgments rendered by American
courts were satisfied by foreign states. See Belman, supra note 231, at 186; Lowenfeld, supra
note 231, at 929; von Mehren, supra note 177, at 43.
252. H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6626.
253. Id. In this statement Congress was apparently referring to foreign sovereign immu-
nity from jurisdiction which prior to 1976 could be secured by the attachment of sovereign's
property. Even in this section, devoted to the new rules of execution of judgments, Congress
did not mention the abolition of the State Department's role in the determination of foreign
sovereign immunity from execution.
254. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.
B. INT'L L. 220 (1951).
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considered whether on the application of the foreign state concerned one
branch of the Executive-such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-should
not be given the power to stay the execution.
255
Although the FSIA promulgates a restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity from execution, it is clear that the need for the State Depart-
ment's right to control execution of judgments against foreign sovereigns
is indispensable in the existing legal regime as well as in the more radical
one advocated by Professor Lauterpacht.
III. Sovereign Immunity and Claims Settlement: The Interplay
The proposed reconstruction of executive power under the FSIA,
which provides for State Department participation in the determination
of foreign sovereign immunity from execution, promotes not only the na-
tion's interest in a sure and potent foreign policy, but also the business
community's interest in effective remedies against foreign states. This
reading of the FSIA, more accurately representing congressional intent,
calls on the State Department to reconsider its unwarranted abstention
from immunity determinations with respect to execution when they im-
plicate the country's foreign affairs.256 Private parties, in turn, should see
through the illusion of a completely non-political remedy against a for-
eign state, independent of international realities.257 Upon reflection, the
virtue of a clearly defined executive role in mediating between foreign
states and private claimants becomes apparent. Recognition of executive
authority over immunity from execution reaffirms the State Depart-
ment's place in resolving international disputes, thereby affording United
States nationals an alternate mechanism for obtaining relief from recalci-
trant foreign states.
255. Id. at 243. Another international authority, Prof. Bouchez of the Netherlands, con-
cluded that the executive branch should be entitled to request foreign sovereign immunity
from execution, although from a judicial standpoint, foreign sovereign immunity from execu-
tion should not be granted. See Bouchez, The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Juris-
diction and Execution, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 19-20 (1979).
256. The Legal Adviser to the State Department wrote to the Attorney General: "The
Department of State will not make any sovereign immunity determinations after the effective
date of P.L. 94-583. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Act for
the Executive Branch to file any suggestions of immunity on or after January 19, 1977." Letter
from the Legal Adviser to the State Department to the Attorney General (Nov. 10, 1976),
reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 50,883 (1976).
257. During a discussion of the 1976 bill, Professor McDougal commented perceptively
that "if our foreign affairs interests were prejudiced by a court taking jurisdiction of a case any
rational President would suggest immunity and any rational court would listen. " 1976 PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 177, at 57. Although Professor McDougal limited his remarks to the
issue of jurisdictional immunity, his reasoning would appear to support the retention of a
limited executive power over immunity from execution. This is particularly true since interfer-
ence on the level of jurisdiction is usually unnecessary and premature if the executive has the
statutory authority to intervene on the level of execution.
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A. Retrieving the Executive's Positive Role
A revival of political discretion over enforcement of judgments against
foreign states poses no danger to the independence of judicial process or
interests of private claimants.258 The courts' primary role in adjudication
of sovereign immunity claims, which Congress conferred upon them in
the FSIA, will restrain the State Department from any attempts to
overuse its discretion. In routine cases, the State Department will have
no incentive to intervene in litigation, especially since it can always make
its views known to the court in an amicus curiae brief. U.S. claimants,
for their part, will face no obstacles to recovery against a foreign state in
a typical commercial dispute. It is only in extraordinary cases, with se-
vere political ramifications, that the State Department will be pressed to
intervene in the proceedings by requesting a stay of execution.
The necessity for the State Department's active involvement in litiga-
tion will arise when the prospect of execution against a foreign state's
property causes the state to threaten a serious breach of relations with
the United States. In this situation, the position of American claimants
is vulnerable to the foreign sovereign's ability to withdraw its commercial
assets from the United States and thus frustrate enforcement of any judg-
ment through judicial process. 259 Under these conditions, it will be in
the common interest of the State Department and private claimants to
improve faltering relations even at the cost of State Department interfer-
ence with a suggestion of immunity from execution. Ultimately, this in-
tervention is consistent with the broad purposes of the FSIA-"to
minimize irritation in foreign relations arising out of such litiga-
tion" 26 0-and advantageous to the claimants themselves, since their
grievances could be redressed through diplomatic negotiations. The con-
ventional reading of the FSIA, to the contrary, excludes the State De-
partment from foreign sovereign immunity disputes and deprives private
258. It should be reemphasized that between 1952 and 1976, when the State Department
possesssed full discretion over immunity decisions-with respect to both jurisdiction and exe-
cution-political considerations were said to have influenced its decision on only four occa-
sions. See supra note 193. Both the State Department's sponsorship of the FSIA and its
subsequent reluctance to interfere in any litigation, even after repeated requests from a foreign
power, underscore its unwillingness to interfere in sovereign immunity proceedings. See State
Department's Response to Notes from the Soviet Embassy Requesting Assistance in an Ongo-
ing Litigation Against Novosti Press Agency and Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, DIG.
U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 515-16 (1977).
259. This result is especially likely since Congress intended the execution provisions of the
FSIA to "provide the judgment creditor some remedy if, after a reasonable period, a foreign
state or its enterprise failed to satisfy a final judgment." H.R. REP., supra note 203, at 6606
(emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1982).
260. Executive Communication from the Department of State and Department of Justice




claimants of a possible non-judicial recovery against recalcitrant foreign
states.26
1
Relaxation of the FSIA pre-judgment attachment rules could also en-
hance the commercial security of potential American claimants and rep-
resents a judicial alternative to diplomatic involvement.262 Yet this
change in the FSIA provisions would defeat the very purpose of the stat-
ute-to transfer the entire process of determining foreign sovereign im-
munity prior to judgment from the State Department to the courts.263
Only a total elimination of pre-judgment attachments for purposes of ob-
taining jurisdiciton allowed Congress to eliminate the State Department's
power over jurisdictional immunity of foreign states.264 Consistency
with this congressional scheme would require reintroduction of the State
Department's right to intervene in sovereign immunity proceedings prior
to the entry of a judgment-as opposed to post-judgment intervention as
suggested in this Article-if pre-judgment attachment rules were liberal-
ized and foreign states, as before 1976, were threatened with the forceful
attachment of their property. Considering that the FSIA provisions on
execution of judgments against foreign states are already more expansive
than the corresponding norms of international practice, 265 it is clearly
preferable to let the State Department assist private claimants in recover-
ing against foreign states by means of political negotiation.
Situations may arise, however, when the State Department's interfer-
ence could impair claimants' ability to collect from a foreign state.
American claimants who have obtained a judgment against a foreign
state may be forced to forego its enforcement. This will occur if the State
Department suggests immunity from execution pursuant to an agreement
with a foreign state that releases, in return, American property in its pos-
session.266 Such an exchange will primarily benefit national interests by
reducing tension in the relations between the states; it will also benefit
261. Had Iran not taken American hostages, and the President not frozen Iranian assets,
the majority of claimants would have been unable to obtain valid attachments of Iranian prop-
erty. This serves as one example of a multitude of situations when the executive branch will
hesitate to initiate offensive measures against a foreign state in order to protect claims of the
U.S. nationals. In these cases, diplomatic negotiations following a stay of execution provide
the only relief available to the claimants.
262. This amendment to the FSIA was advocated in Smit, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic Surgery, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 48, 67-68 (1979).
Although the author acknowledged the destabilizing impact of attachments on foreign rela-
tions, he did not examine the necessity for State Department involvement in sovereign immu-
nity proceedings if such an amendment were passed.
263. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 244 and 247.
266. The return of the hostages held by a foreign state is a good example of an overwhelm-
ing national interest requiring State Department intervention in the judicial process. The sub-
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individuals whose rights were violated by the foreign state. However,
there may be private claimants whose property interests are sacrificed for
the sake of these agreements and who may suffer an uncompensable loss.
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 267 provides a good illustration of the ex-
ecutive's use of foreign sovereign immunity laws to block execution
against foreign sovereign property in order to reach a diplomatic accom-
modation. The court followed the State Department's suggestion of im-
munity and denied execution against a Cuban vessel held as security by
the plaintiffs. The released ship was returned to Cuba in exchange for a
hijacked Eastern Airlines plane.2 68 Discussed in the context of foreign
sovereign immunity laws, the incident stirred heated debate in the aca-
demic community.269
Viewed from a different angle, Rich constitutes in essence a classic
claims settlement agreement.270 It is a notable example of limited execu-
tive interference with the expectations of private claimants for the sake of
concrete national interests. Undoubtedly, the executive could have
reached its objective through a formal claims settlement agreement with
Cuba, as the court acknowledged in its decision.271 This agreement
would not have been defeated either by individuals, who had no rights to
a secured judgment, 272 nor by Congress and the judiciary which had sup-
ject of an agreement can certainly be more mundane, such as a legal claim to commercial
goods, but usually the two sides will give up comparable values.
267. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), affid, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
268. See supra note 199.
269. Professor Lillich described the case as "one of the international legal monstrosities
." 1969 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 231, at 191. Cardozo, on the other hand, charged that
a political monstrosity would have resulted from the failure to grant immunity. Id. at 194.
270. Within the framework of sovereign immunity law, this episode may be analyzed as
an exercise in reciprocity which, like claims settlement, relies on give and take between na-
tions. Reciprocity is a widely practiced norm recognized by international law. It has been
adopted in Italy, see Condorelli and Sbolci, supra note 247, at 212-213; Yugoslavia, see
Varady, Immunity of State Property from Execution in the Yugoslav Legal System, 10 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 94-95 (1979); and the United Kingdom, see Higgins, Execution of State
Property: United Kingdom Practice, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 35, 52 (1979). For the statutory
rules in socialist countries, which adhere to the principle of reciprocity in sovereign immunity
proceedings, see 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 563-64, 580-82 (Soviet
Union and Poland). Although reciprocity was considered to be one of the relevant factors in
drafting the FSIA, U.S. courts have nlver formally adopted it. For criticism of the reciprocity
rule, see Lauterpacht, supra note 254, at 245.
271. In Rich, the court explicitly stated that the State Department could have settled
claims against the Cuban vessel under the authority of Ex Parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1942),
although it chose not to do so. 197 F. Supp. at 720.
272. It should be remembered that the case was decided during an era of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity from execution, and that the government-owned ship, diverted to the




ported analogous agreements in the past.273 Without question, the State
Department's recourse to a binding suggestion of immunity from execu-
tion, as a more expedient and less overt mechanism for consummating
the agreement, should have the same legal consequences as a valid claims
settlement agreement leading to an identical outcome.
In fact, many cases traditionally analyzed like Rich, in the context of
foreign sovereign immunity law, often obscure an underlying claims set-
tlement agreement. When the government grants immunity to foreign
state property seized by private claimants, it essentially forfeits-or
settles-the private claims. The claims are settled for the sake of na-
tional political interests, though a formal settlement agreement is not
created.274
In Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,275 the first sovereign immunity
case in United States law, the government argued that claims against
foreign states may be presented solely by the government, not by private
individuals. Chief Justice Marshall, clearly perceived the interplay be-
tween private seizure of foreign sovereign property in the United States
and public settlement of claims in the diplomatic arena.276
In yet another landmark case, Ex Parte Peru, 277 the mingling of a State
Department suggestion of immunity and a claims settlement agreement
was all but forgotten. In that case, sensitive to the same concerns as in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, the Supreme Court expressly ad-
dressed the issue and stated:
Claims against [a friendly sovereign state] are normally presented and set-
tled in the course of foreign affairs by the President and by the Department
of State. When the Secretary of State elects to settle claims by diplomatic
negotiations between the two countries rather than by continued litigation
in the courts, it is of public importance that the action of the political arm
of the government be promptly recognized, and that the delay and incon-
venience of a prolonged litigation be avoided by prompt termination of the
proceedings in the district court.278
273. See, eg., Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886) (French spoliation claims); Pink
v. United States, 315 U.S. 302 (1942) (Litvinov Assignment).
274. It can be argued that all suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity constitute an in-
ternational exchange of favors, although they are not always clear and tangible to an unin-
formed observer. Thus, Professor Reisman noted that Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Faddon
was prompted by political considerations favoring an alliance with France against Britain in
the War of 1812. Formation of such an alliance could have been hindered by non-recognition
of French sovereignty over the ship. See Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a
New Genre of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 15 (1984).
275. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
276. Id. at 146.
277. 318 U.S. 578 (1942).
278. Id. at 587. A similar situation was present in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 199
N.Y.S. 2d, 23 Misc. 2d 243 (Sup. Ct.), affid, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 15 A.D.2d 111 (1961) in which
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As perceptively observed by Richard Lillich, "by intervening in sover-
eign immunity and act of state cases when negotiations are pending or
have even not begun, the Department of State attempts, very successfully
one may add, to impose the Pink rationale on American courts in the
absence of an overriding executive agreement. ' 279 Phrased differently,
the executive's immunization and release of foreign property subject to
claims of American citizens helps consummate a claims settlement agree-
ment with a foreign state.
In essence, executive authority to immunize foriegn sovereign property
is indispensable to settle claims between nations, whether by means of a
formal claims settlement agreement, such as the one with Iran, or by
means of informal negotiations leading to the resolution of a dispute be-
tween two nations. Consequently, denial of executive control over deter-
mination of foreign sovereign immunity from execution undercuts the
executive claims settlement power. 280
B. Executive Conduct During the Iranian Crisis
The status of foreign state property in the United States and the settle-
ment of private claims were inextricably linked during the Iranian crisis.
The basic objective of the executive branch, intent on enforcing the
agreements with Iran, was the termination of domestic litigation so that
American commercial claims could be adjudicated in the new claims tri-
bunal and Iranian property could be returned to Iran. Prevailing doc-
trines of claims settlement, in both domestic and international law, show
how these goals could be achieved without infringing on federal court
jurisdiction.
Upon entering a formal claims settlement, the government "trans-
forms" a private claim into one that is public (to follow traditional legal
doctrine), or simply takes control of the claim away from private claim-
ants. In either formulation, the legal impact is the same: the claim is no
longer cognizable in domestic courts, and an action may be dismissed. 281
the court refused to grant immunity at the State Department's suggestion, notwithstanding the
adverse impact of its decision on ongoing claims settlement negotiations. The court based its
refusal on the determination that the property in question did not belong to the foreign state
involved.
279. R. LILLICH, supra note 30, at 199-200.
280. The linkage between the right to make suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity
from execution and claims settlement power is recognized in modem scholarship. Executive
interference with execution is advocated as a necessary element of claims settlement agree-
ments. See, eg., Bouchez, supra note 255, at 30 ("Intervention by the forum state may also
occur in the form of settling the claim of a private person against a foreign state, and dealing
with this claim through direct negotiations or other means for the international settlements of
disputes."




The validity of executive termination of domestic lawsuits, in the con-
text of claims settlement, becomes clearer once a common misunder-
standing about the Iranian agreement is dispelled. The settlement
agreement did not preserve private claims and simply transfer them to a
new forum. Instead, the agreement provided for an arbitral tribunal as a
means of settling claims between the United States and Iran. Other
mechanisms of compensation, such as a lump sum award with domestic
valuation, were possible. The form of settlement is not critical.282 In fact,
the executive might have waived claims entirely without securing any
compensation whatsoever,2 83 and without incurring liability to American
claimants. 284
While this accounts for the claims settlement aspect of the Iranian
agreements, the transfer of Iranian property still requires clarification.
The Court in Dames & Moore relied on IEEPA as a foundation for exec-
utive authority to withdraw licenses permitting encumbrance of Iranian
property, thereby nullifying judicial attachments. 285 The nullification ap-
plied to all Iranian property that had been attached under government
licenses issued pursuant to the presidential freeze order.286
Under the Court's reasoning, Congress conferred power on the execu-
tive to exercise such control over foreign assets during national emergen-
Cir. 1981) (holding that the President's action took away a claim upon which relief could be
granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). See also Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't and State of
Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981). In Security Pacific, Judge Kelleher convincingly
demonstrated that the FSIA did not limit the President's "independent, and well-established,
power under the Constitution, to settle a particular set of outsanding claims against a foreign
government." Id. at 881. He concluded that executive settlement did not take away federal
jurisdiction but simply rendered the controversy before it "moot." Id Although this decision
does not examine the theoretical background of claims settlement, it closely approaches the
analysis of independent executive power and claims settlement presented in this Article.
282. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
283. Interestingly, American officials may have considered the possibility of waiving pri-
vate claims, since they regarded success under international law as unlikely. They saw the
establishment of a claims tribunal as a positive step for American claimants. See 1981 Hear-
ings, supra note 31, at 54, 57-58, 60-61 (testimony of Warren Christopher).
284. See supra note 95. Some critics were also uneasy because the termination was imple-
mented in a heavy-handed manner that put courts in a needlessly awkward position. Courts
that were otherwise deferential to the executive's claims settlement authority, and seemingly
untroubled by their alleged loss of jurisdiction, balked at enforcing the suspension order. See,
e.g., American Int'l Group, 657 F.2d at 445; Security Pac Nat'l Bank 518 F. Supp. at 881-82.
As one court observed, "[alIthough it is within the powers of the President. . .to settle inter-
national claims, it is manifestly not within the President's powers to order this Court to imple-
ment such. . . settlements in any particular manner." Id. at 881. Direct enforcement of the
President's suspension order, which virtually dictated a holding to courts, would have
subordinated the judiciary to the executive's will. To achieve the same purpose, the executive
simply could have intervened in litigation and called on courts to dismiss the suits, thereby
upholding the executive agreements.
285. 453 U.S. at 572-74.
286. See supra note 2.
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cies. The Court posited no theory of independent executive authority to
immunize foreign property from judicial encumbrance, either in a na-
tional emergency or otherwise.287
The absence of an adequate legal theory became critical in Electronic
Data Systems Corp. v. Iran Social Sec. Organization, 288 in which unlike
Dames & Moore and all other cases arising out of the claims settlement
agreement, the plaintiffs had (1) received a judgment prior to the signing
of the settlement agreement and (2) attached Iranian property prior to
the executive freeze order. Thus, they regarded their remedy as in-
dependent of and unaffected by the President's orders. The executive
sought a vacation of the attachments to effect the transfer of state prop-
erty under the hostage release agreements, but two courts turned its re-
quest down. The district court sweepingly rejected both executive
authority to terminate lawsuits as an unconsitutional violation of its ju-
risdiction, and executive authority to vacate valid judicial attach-
ments. 289 After Dames & Moore was decided, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment with respect to
claims suspension yet upheld the order preserving attachments on Ira-
nian property.290 It appeared that the executive's authority to dislodge a
foreign state's property was contingent on the timing of the attachment
and on the interpretation of the IEEPA, enacted only four years before
the Iranian crisis.
The executive in Electronic Data Systems, instead of asserting its in-
dependent authority to block execution against a foreign state's property,
relied on a new, untested statute. Had the theory of independent author-
ity been presented, the court would have had to confront the executive's
discretion to immunize a foreign state's property from execution when
international relations required it. This did not happen. The district
court instead found the IEEPA inadequate to warrant executive interfer-
ence, tying the executive's hands, when in fact the President retained the
authority to grant Iranian property immunity from execution.
In contrast, the proper result was reached in Hawaiian Agronomics Co.
v. Iran.291 There a foreign claimant sought to block action by the United
States and Iran seeking a dismissal of its suit and vacation of attach-
ments. The court did not dismiss the private action, holding that the
plaintiff, as a foreign national, was not bound by the claims settlement
287. See supra note 29.
288. 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex.), vacated in part, affid in part, 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.
1981).
289. 508 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
290. 651 F.2d at 1011.




agreement, but it did vacate the attachments. Thus, the plaintiff could
proceed with the litigation but obtain, at best, an unsecured judgment.
The case reveals that the executive may exercise its power to remove
(immunize) foreign state property without infringing on the courts' juris-
diction over foreign states.
Conclusion
Although the Iranian hostage crisis was one of the most trying epi-
sodes in recent American diplomacy-a situation normally warranting
broad executive discretion-substantial opposition and doctrinal uncer-
tainty emerged immediately after the President decisively exercised his
authority in obtaining the hostages' release. This Article has attempted
to show that the opposition was unfounded and that the doctrinal sup-
port is clear. The executive has independent authority to settle claims
and to block execution against a foreign state's property. These two
powers together equip the President to deal swiftly and surely in a for-
eign policy crisis. Their exercise will normally work to the benefit of pri-
vate citizens injured by foreign states and will not threaten either the
independence of courts or the prerogatives of Congress.
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